

**Moral Education and Authority:
A Model for Education that Understands Moral Growth as a
Consequence of the Teacher-Learner Relationship**

By

Lisa MacDonald

Supervisor: Dr. Andrea English

Committee Members: Dr. Donovan Plumb, Dr. Mary Jane Harkins

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To my mother and Mary,

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Abstract

In this thesis, I develop the connection between moral growth of the learner and the teacher-learner relationship. In part one of the thesis, I analyze aspects of moral education in the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, J. F. Herbart, and John Dewey. My focus on these three thinkers provides a basis for understanding the educative nature of the teacher-learner relationship as one that develops the learner's critical, reflective self-self relationship. To do this, I focus on developing the notions of self-love, inner censor, and freedom. In part two, I connect the concepts from part one to the work of contemporary theorists David Hansen and Nel Noddings, in order to further explicate the concepts of the teacher and the learner and illuminate what constitutes an educational teacher-learner relation. Furthermore, using these new conceptions of teacher and learner as a basis, I discuss how we can reconceptualize the teacher's authority. On the understanding of education and teaching that I develop, the teacher is a skilled architect who designs the learning environment of the classroom in such a way that the components of caring, respect, understanding, value, and safety are at the forefront of all pedagogical judgments. Accordingly, as I underscore through-out the thesis, the teacher has the responsibility to create moral learning spaces and guide interactions within these spaces in such a way that the moral development of the learner can flourish. I close the thesis with a critical discussion of current moral education initiatives in schools, and develop three criteria for evaluating future moral education initiatives.

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My very identity as a teacher has developed from each individual relationship I have made with all the learners I have taught over the past 10 years. The teacher and person I am today is a wonderful compilation of all those interactions. I thank all the learners for contributing to my growth. Indeed, my passion for education –a vision and message that advocates for a model of education that allows learners to be discovered and develop into the persons they want to be, as well as this thesis, my non-profit organization Strong Girls, and continuing to be a teacher, are my gifts back to them in honor of their light.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their love and dedication, and for giving me the quiet time and space to reflect and imagine, as I pursued this project over the past 5 years.

“The fundamental problem of education is how to make a pupil a moral being, one possessing a good will.”¹

¹ Dunkel (1969, 65).

Introduction

The aim of this thesis is to uncover forgotten notions of moral education. In many models of moral education found in schools today, there is a strong focus on the outwards expressions of social behavior and a significant lack of attention to human connections, relationships, responsibility, compassion, and respect. What theory of moral education should guide a system of schooling where the teacher's aim is to not only develop the academic faculties of the learner but also to nurture and develop the learner's inner self-self relation? By examining key writings of significant philosophers of education, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, J.F. Herbart, John Dewey as well as of contemporary thinkers, I argue that moral education involves an indirect approach towards the learner that considers the development of the inner censor as cultivated through the teacher-learner relationship.

On my view, in public schools today, there often lacks a strong grasp of the nature of the teacher-learner relation that provides a foundation for the learner's moral growth. Commonly in schools, there are two forms of initiatives that promote certain interactions with learners that one might assume are 'moral education', namely, character-education and behavior management initiatives. The former can often be found in health curriculum guides, where learners are meant to learn about favorable traits that would increase their chances of being socially accepted. Traits such as kindness, sharing, respect, and the like are 'taught' formally through the use of worksheets and role-play in the classroom setting. The latter, behavior management initiatives, involve strategies that teachers can use to manage a learner's behavior in hopes to form it into positive social expression. This includes, but is not limited to, behavior plans and reward charts. This type of management is based on an *if you do this you will get that* concept and manipulates behavior by promising rewards at the end. These initiatives train learners to follow

what good behavior looks like, dictates how they ought to behave, and provides consequences for learners when the rules are broken. Within all this, there is a strong focus on the outward expressions of social behavior and a formidable lack on human connection, relationships, responsibility, compassion, and respect.

Underlying both of these models, I contend, is a problematic understanding of the teacher-learner relationship that gives rise to an illegitimate notion of teacher authority. In both methodologies, the teacher is the problem-solver, behavior manager and decision-maker, and this, I contend, is a misuse and misinterpretation of the teacher's authority. The learner is not given the chance to reflect on his own and guide his future actions. The current trend towards a narrowed focus on behavior management is just a reinvented and more creative way of engaging in traditional education models. These models of education reinforce undemocratic forms of the teacher-learner relationship: they set up the teacher as unquestioned authority and the learner as one who must blindly obey.

What is ignored or overlooked by these models is the heart of moral education, which lies in the development of the learner's reflective self-self relation. The notions of moral education as theorized by philosophers of education Jean-Jacques Rousseau, J. F. Herbart, and John Dewey, allow for a different understanding of the teacher-learner relationship and a different understanding of authority. In this thesis, I will focus on these three thinkers as a basis for understanding the educative nature of the teacher-learner relationship as one that develops the self-love, inner censor, and freedom within each learner. Within this relationship, space is created for trust, caring, interactions, forgiveness, mutual respect, and growth.

Drawing on contemporary theorists David Hansen and Nel Noddings, I will then analyze the notion of the teacher and learner and how they relate in educational contexts. By highlighting these key ideas, I develop a new conception of the teacher and the learner. David Hansen helps

us learn about the teacher as person, and he defines how this contributes directly to the relationship that fosters the moral development of the learner. Likewise, the learner should be perceived as a person, which compliments Dewey's argument for the allowance of a learning space that encompasses freedom and individualism. Nel Noddings contributes to this by providing perspective on the learner as the cared-for and the teacher as the one-caring. Within these roles, both parties have responsibilities, expectations, and assumptions that color the model of moral education. It's important to deconstruct how the learner should be perceived so that we can define and identify the components that indirectly influence his or her² moral development. The learner must be perceived in a human way, and not as standard or generic nor passive or obedient, as certain traditional notions of the learner maintain. The teacher's role is to provide the space for the learner's humanness and learning.

Using these new conceptions of teacher and learner as a basis, I discuss how we can reconceptualise the teacher's authority. In order to re-examine the traditional understanding of authority, we must also take into consideration the purpose in learning that it served; namely, that authority was positional and used as a means to enforce obedience by following rules and punishing rule-breakers. I seek to put forth an understanding of authority where power is not one-sided, but rather continuously *negotiated* by the teacher and the learner. This means that both the teacher and learner have power in the classroom at the same time, and that this power is used to meet and embrace the thoughts, desires, and purpose of the learner. According to this definition, the learner has the power to express his or her individuality and the teacher has the

² As a note to readers, with regard to how I use generic nouns and pronouns in this thesis, I attempt to alternate between generic male and generic female nouns and pronouns when referring to the teacher or learner. In certain cases, especially in chapter one, when an example from an author uses generic male nouns or pronouns, I continue this usage because I am referring to the teacher or learner in the examples used by those authors. However, in all other parts of the thesis my usage should be understood as inclusive of all human beings.

power to work with the learner in shaping these expressions in a way that promotes future educative experiences that recognize and respect the self and the other. On my model, the teacher is a skilled architect who designs the learning environment of the classroom and orchestrates it in such a way that the components of caring, respect, understanding, value, and safety provide space for the learner to develop moral self-understanding and respect for himself and others. Accordingly, the teacher has the responsibility to create moral learning spaces and guide interactions within this space with such tact that the moral development of the learner can flourish.

In summary, in this thesis I focus on examining the teacher-learner relationship in the context of moral education. I draw out the understanding of moral education, which is based in fostering a certain type of environment that allows for certain kinds of human experiences. My research methodology is philosophical analysis.

Part One focuses on the development of the learner's self-self relation. I analyze the educational theories of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann F. Herbart, and John Dewey. In Part One, I will discuss certain aspects of moral education in order to explicate the connection between the educational context and the learner's self-self relation. Specifically, in chapter one, I explore education as a cultivation of an individual's humanity using the philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and J.F. Herbart. In sections one and two, the central text I use is Rousseau's *Emile* (1762). I examine Rousseau's idea of the nature of moral education, by focusing on his distinction between *amour de soi-même* and *amour-propre*. In section three, I explore Herbart's understanding of the connection between education and morality. For Herbart, the aim of all education is morality. The notion of the *good will* introduced in Herbart's *On the Aesthetic Revelation of the World as the Chief Work of Education* (1804) will prove important. On

Herbart's model, moral guidance aims to help the learner develop a *good will*. Furthermore, central to understanding Herbart's theory of education as morality is the idea of the inner censor that is cultivated in connection with the development of the good will. The inner censor is significant for understanding the self-self relation of the learner as I will clarify.

In chapter two, I develop Dewey's notion of the democratic educational context. I focus on the interconnection of freedom and experience within the learning environment as critical for the moral development of the learner. For Dewey, freedom means having the space to develop one's thoughts, desires, and purpose (internal), while at the same time having the allowance of physical movement and action (external). The two are inseparable and freedom within both the internal and external allow for the teacher to gain awareness of the learner's starting point and aims.

In *Experience and Education* (1938) and *The Moral Principles in Education* (1909), Dewey underscores that the educational context needs to be constructed with care and intention, and in such a way that the thoughts and desires, or the experiences, of the learner can happen while being afforded positive direction. That is, the quality of the experience should be educative and it needs to be democratic in nature and embrace the freedom of the learner – a place to express one's thoughts, desires, and purpose. The school must not be perceived as an isolated social institution. I discuss how this type of learning needs to be experiential in that “the only way to prepare for social life, is to engage in social life” (Dewey 1909, 27).

In Part Two, I explore the philosophical conceptions of the teacher, learner, and their interrelationship. Specifically, in chapter three, I investigate this relationship to learn about how it affects the learner's self-self relation: Who is the learner? Who is the teacher? and What does an educational teacher-learner relationship look like? While drawing on contemporary thinkers

such as Nel Noddings, David Hansen, Maxine Greene, Nicholas Burbules, and Max van Manen. I will also be mindful of the consequences of the educational theories presented by Rousseau, Herbart, and Dewey. The notions of *the learner* and *the teacher* will be important to clarify because the understandings and assumptions of these philosophical definitions heavily influence how the teacher and learner think they ought to behave, both individually and towards one another.

In chapter four, I develop a conception of teacher authority, and I examine and discuss how the notions of power and discipline inform this conception. The key concepts that comprise the new definition of authority are the teacher as planner and constructor of the educative environment; the teacher as “guide on the side”, and; the teacher as relating with the learner through “power” and “discipline”. The notion of negative knowledge, that is, being critical of one’s practice, and engaging in reflection, is also central to the teacher establishing and being responsible for her authority. In the first section, I define the teacher’s authority as grounded in the role of planning, constructing, and orchestrating the special educational context. This, as stated by Dewey, is done through the way the classroom mirrors the social world. I define the classroom as a place of freedom and democracy, in which the learner is provided the opportunity to experience his or her thoughts, desires, and purposes. The ability to construct and offer this environment is one aspect of the teacher’s authority and it aims to develop the learner’s moral self-self relation as I defined in Part One.

In section two, I discuss the concept of the teacher’s authority as “guide on the side” using Paul Nash’s work *Authority and Freedom in Education* (1966). I present the idea that although the teacher’s authority is in that of creating the educational environment, within this

authority there is also a need to guide the expressions of the learner's thoughts, desires, and purpose.

In the third section, I argue that the teacher's authority is also defined through her relationship with the learner using Nicholas Burbules' ideas of relational authority. I develop the notion of "relational" to argue how the common perception of power and discipline need to be reconsidered in order to support an educational model that embraces the moral development of the learner.

The type of power in a model of education that supports moral education is "relational power". Wilmot and Hoher (2001) describe relational power as "a property of the social relationship, rather than a quality of the individual" (104). This definition differentiates relational power from positional power as seen in a traditional model of education where the teacher exercises control and demands obedience. Relational power implies that power is negotiated by both the teacher and the learner and is interpersonal and not owned by one or the other. In this sense, I argue that power should be used appropriately to facilitate experiences that embrace the learner's thoughts, desires, and purpose while, at the same time, foster the development of his or her moral self-self relation. Power should not be used as a punitive tool to humiliate or control, nor as a means to manipulate behaviour for obedience. Authority and power must be used as a means to positively influence the moral development of the learner. I close the chapter with considerations of how power is considered in terms of respect by both the teacher and the learner.

My personal motivation in exploring this thesis topic stems in part from my experience as an upper elementary teacher in the Halifax Regional School Board for eight years. As a teacher, I have seen many initiatives to improve classroom behavior. For this reason, in Chapter Five, I

analyze the possibilities and limitations of three current initiatives. Finally, on the basis of the notions developed in this thesis, I develop criteria for evaluating future moral education initiatives. This thesis concludes with reflections on a future model of moral education. Within this reflection, I will also discuss some of the challenges that educators face to overturn a long-standing reward and punishment learning system.

Part I: The Forgotten Aspects of Moral Education – A Theoretical Analysis

Chapter 1: The Cultivation of the Good Will J.-J. Rousseau and J.F. Herbart on Education and Morality

...while we live, while we are among human beings, let us cultivate our humanity³.

-Seneca

Any investigation into the aims of education will reveal a colorful repertoire of pedagogical theories grounded in psychology, sociology, and philosophy. Psychology contributed to the theories of child-centered, whole-language, behaviorist, and constructivist learning, and the aims of education extracted from sociology lend to theories of relationships. This thesis looks to philosophy to understand an aspect of education that has been largely neglected. This aspect is morality. Indeed, looking to the more popular theories of psychology and sociology, we have drawn on traditional social norms to focus our perception of education as developing the cognitive realm of the child. We depended on the assumption that if something could be taught then it could be learned. This led to an industrial and mechanistic system⁴ which used the school as a factory to produce the model citizen and economic contributor to society. However, within all this, there is a great gap within the classroom aside from the academic way in which we teach and learn. More specifically, this gap exists in how we *are* with ourselves and with others. Within this ‘factory’ perception of generating accomplished learners by processing youth through educational institutions, many key concepts have been neglected. And, perhaps none of these concepts are greater than that of morality.

³As cited in Nussbaum, M.C. *Cultivating humanity: A classical defense of reform in liberal education*. Harvard University Press (1997, xiii).

⁴See Pike & Selby (1998, 24-29).

Contrasting this with the ideas presented by educational thinkers like J. J. Rousseau and J.F. Herbart, we see a different model of education that focuses on learning that aims to cultivate a good will within the learner; one that develops within him a self-love that is understood in relation with his own self-preservation and that of others. As I will discuss in this chapter, for educational theory and practice to address the forgotten moral aspects of education, they must include an understanding of human development and the process of a learner coming to know him- or herself as a human being. On such a model, the learner will seek to view himself as an end and not merely as a means to an end. The learner will understand his or her agency and freedom, and will understand that others have agency and freedom. In turn, the learner will become aware of his capabilities and capacities and he will develop an understanding and respect of his natural human self. By examining Rousseau's notions of self-love and Herbart's notion of inner freedom, I aim to demonstrate that when a human being becomes aware of him- or herself in the aforementioned ways, he or she will develop an understanding and respect for others as human beings.

1.1 Rousseau's *Emile* and the Development of *Amour de Soi-même* and *Amour-Propre*

In *Emile* (1762), Jean Jacques Rousseau recognizes that human beings have a drive to change, evolve, and improve to meet their needs. We could say that for Rousseau, human beings naturally want to be the best that they can be, but this requires that they develop what he calls self-love. In this section, I discuss Rousseau's two concepts of self-love, *amour de soi-même* and *amour-propre* and point out how they are interrelated. In doing so, my aim is to reveal how Rousseau's concepts can inform our understanding of moral development.

Before turning to Rousseau's concepts of self-love, it is important to note that Rousseau's underlying assumption is that human beings are capable of learning. This capacity to learn is what he calls the faculty of *perfectibilité* or self-perfection. Rousseau makes a remark about the difference between human beings and other animals. He states that, "...there is another [aside from being a free agent]⁵ very specific quality which distinguishes them [man and animal] and about which there can be no argument: the faculty of self-perfection, a faculty which, with the aid of circumstances, successively develops all others, and resides among us as much in the species as in the individual" (Rousseau 1755/1992, 25). While other animals can learn in certain respects, human *perfectibilité*, for Rousseau, distinguishes human beings from other animals in that human beings have the capability to be moral; they can make judgements based in reason and they can will. This means that human beings need not to only follow their instincts. Because of *perfectibilité*, humans can change their behavior and previous decisions because they can think, imagine, will, and reflect.

But just because human beings can learn and change does not mean that they will necessarily become moral and grow towards respecting others. For this reason, how a human being is educated is very important for Rousseau. For Rousseau, the starting point of the development of morality is the formation of the will. This formation, grounded in self-love, determines how we view others and ourselves, and it provides the perspective of which we form judgements about what we consider good or not. Rousseau identifies two types of self-love; *amour de soi-même* and *amour-propre*:

⁵ Prior to the concept of *perfectibilité*, Rousseau argues that the first distinction between man and animal is that animals acted according to their nature and instincts, while man could choose to go against his nature and act as a free agent: "In any animal I see nothing but an ingenious machine to which nature has given senses in order for it to renew its strength and to protect itself, to a certain point, from all that tends to destroy or disturb it. I am aware of precisely the same things in the human machine, with the difference that nature alone does everything in the operations of the animal, whereas man contributes, as a free agent, to his own operations" (1755/1992, 25).

We must not confuse egocentrism [*amour-propre*] with love of oneself [*amour de soi-même*]; two passions very different by virtue of both their nature and their effects. Love of oneself [*amour de soi-même*] is a natural sentiment which moves every animal to be vigilant in its own preservation and which, directed by man in reason and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue. Egocentrism [*amour-propre*] is merely a sentiment that is relative, artificial and born in society, which moves each individual to value himself more than anyone else, which inspires in men all the evils they cause one another, and which is the true source of honor⁶. (1755/1992, 90, note 15)

Amour de soi-même is described as a love of oneself based in self-preservation. This type of self-love serves one's preservation and it is this self-love that exists in natural man. *Amour de soi-même* helps man realize his humanness; he is a being of desires, passions, needs, error, accomplishment, etc. *Amour-propre* is the self-love that exists in civilized man, and is usually awakened by comparing oneself to others. Furthermore, *amour-propre* is that self-love based in the opinions and judgments of others.

In *Emile* (1762), Rousseau argues that education which fosters the growth of a child's *amour de soi-même* is the beginning of his moral education. In fact, he explicitly states, "Our true study is that of the human condition. He among us who best knows how to bear the goods and ills of this life is to my taste the best raised: from which it follows that the true education consists less in precept than in practice. We begin to instruct ourselves when we begin to live. Our education begins with us" (Rousseau 1762/1979, 42). An education that "begins with us" is

⁶ See Rousseau, *Du Contract Social Écrits Politiques*, (1755/1964, 1376): "Rousseau was not the first person to establish and talk about the difference between the love of self (*amour de soi meme*) and egocentrism (*amour propre*). Jaques Abbadie did in 'l'Art de se Connoitre soy-meme 1692'. Marie Huber also talked about them in 'lettres sur la Religion Essentielle a l'Homme, 1738'. In one of Rousseau's notebooks, he wrote: 'in egocentrism we can find happiness outside. We are not content with ourselves which makes us seek what we lack in others. We depend on the outside, lack confidence, are not unique. Self-love is the opposite. It depends on an individual's own happiness. The person is satisfied and content with himself. He does not lack attention'. Rousseau looked at both kinds of love from a different perspective."

one where the learner engages in experiences that allow him to learn about what he knows, or does not yet know, what he is capable, or not yet capable of.

In his story of Emile, Rousseau gives an example of education that begins with the self. Rousseau's intention for Emile was to have his education begin with himself, so that he learns to use his body, capacities, and senses to achieve his desires and passions. This starts, for Rousseau, by giving Emile varied experiences and not allowing him to form fixed habits: "The only habit that a child should be allowed is to contract none...Prepare from afar the reign of his freedom and the use of his forces by leaving natural habit to his body, by putting him in the condition always to be a master of himself and in all things to do his will, as soon as he has one" (1762/1979, 63). By not forming fixed habits, Emile learns to understand different situations and his abilities or lacks within them. He learns to depend little on others, and he labors his way to learn to preserve himself.

Though the idea of self-preservation seems to imply self-interest and not caring for others, Rousseau's point in beginning education with the development of self-love, is not to develop self-interest, but rather to develop the child's sense of independence and capacity for self-formation. Learning to act for one's own preservation means not acting as a master of men, nor of things; it is in this way that the development of *amour de soi-même* is the beginning of a moral education:

When the child stretches out his hand without saying anything, he believes he will reach the object because he does not estimate the distance. He is mistaken. But when he complains and screams in reaching out his hand, he is no longer deceived as to the distance; he is ordering the object to approach or you to bring it to him. In the first case carry him to the object slowly and with small steps. In the second act as though you do not hear him. The more he screams, the less you should listen to him. It is important to accustom him early not to give orders either to men, for he is not their master, or to

things, for they do not hear him. Thus, when a child desires something that he sees and one wants to give it to him, it is better to carry the child to the object than to bring the object to the child. He draws from this practice a conclusion appropriate to his age, and there is no other means to suggest it to him. (Rousseau 1762/1979, 66)

Rousseau's example demonstrates the connection between a child's discovery about his abilities and his understanding of his capacity for self-formation, or *perfectibilité*. Moreover, the example highlights the fact that the child begins to ask, "What are my intentions, impulses, and desires?" and he wonders about the ways in which he can accomplish his own aims. *Amour de soi-même* is the seed of moral development because it prevents an individual from using others as a means to achieve his own ends⁷.

Rousseau's notion of *amour-propre*, unlike *amour de soi-même*, is the self-love that fuels the ego and is based in the opinions and judgments of others. As mentioned in *A Discourse of the Origin of Inequality* (1755) Rousseau describes *amour-propre* as "merely a sentiment that is relative, artificial and born in society, which moves each individual to value himself more than anyone else" (p. 90, note 15). It is with the development of *amour-propre* where Rousseau warns us of the possibility of diverging onto one of two paths: the formation of a negative or destructive self-love or a positive form. Rousseau reminds us that as social beings the development of *amour-propre* is inevitable, and that depending on one's lived experiences, this type of self-love can contribute to the cultivation of one's humanity and moral sensibility or it can interfere with it.

The negative and destructive self-love can develop from experiences that feed the ego and change the self to work from a competitive drive. This self-love is indulgent, self-serving of

⁷ I will return to this idea in my discussion of morality and the Categorical Imperative in the Herbart section.

the passions, and egocentric at the expense of others⁸. A negative *amour-propre*, sometimes translated as egocentrism or vanity, changes the direction of one's desires from being the best he can be for his own self-preservation towards a competitive nature that directs him to be 'better' than someone else. An individual working from this type of self-love defines himself based on what others think of him.

The development of a positive *amour-propre* results from experiences where one learns the connections between his own self-preservation and the virtues of pity and compassion. This self-love is positive because it not only serves the needs of the individual and connects him to his humanity, but he sees that his humanity is like that of others, and he learns to meet his needs by relating to and being compassionate towards other people. In this case, the individual develops what Rousseau calls the virtues of pity and compassion. When an individual realizes that he could have easily been in the same difficult situation in which he sees another, his will becomes directed in compassion for the state of that other person: "Nature, in giving men tears, bears witness that she gave the human race the softest hearts" (Rousseau 1755/1992, 37). It is this *amour-propre*, that which derives from pity and compassion, and is coupled with *amour de soi-même*, that underpin the model of moral education that I am developing here. I return to the positive sense of *amour-propre* in the next section. First, I examine the negative sense.

For Rousseau, one of the most prominent practices that leads to the premature development of destructive *amour-propre* (one that comes prior to *amour de soi-même*) is imposed restriction. Imposed restriction, as seen in Rousseau's example of responding to the tears of a baby with either striking him or ignoring him can be either direct or indirect. Imposed restriction, that is, restriction which only serves the caregiver or educator but not the child, does

⁸ See Rousseau (1755/1992, 90, note 15).

not afford the child further educative experiences. Instead it teaches the child that he must compete with others for his self-preservation and importance. It prevents the child from being free to learn about his needs, wants, and desires. This destructive form of restriction, one that goes beyond preventing the child from harming himself or others, includes the use of force and passions (fear, jealousy) to prevent the child from acting on his or her well intentioned will.

The reason Rousseau is against the practice of direct imposed restriction is because it hinders the development of *amour de soi-même*. Rousseau demonstrates how this restriction is physically put into effect in the first few months of an infant's life. He makes us aware of how this practice of direct restriction affects the child's will indirectly, as well as how it works against the natural inclinations of an infant. Rousseau reveals how those responsible for the care and nurturing of a child introduce him to restriction beginning at infancy:

The newborn baby needs to stretch and move its limbs in order to arouse them from the torpor in which, drawn up in a little ball, they have for so long remained. They are stretched out, it is true, but they are prevented from moving. Even the head is subjected to caps. It seems that we are afraid lest he appear to be alive. Thus, the impulse of the internal parts of a body which tends to growth find an insurmountable obstacle to the movements that impulse asks of the body. The baby constantly makes useless efforts which exhaust its forces or retard their progress. He was less cramped, less constrained, less compressed in the amnion than he is in his diapers. I do not see what he has gained by being born. The inaction, the constraint in which a baby's limbs are kept can only hinder the circulation of the blood, of the humors, prevent the baby from fortifying himself, and cause his constitution to degenerate... Could not so cruel a constraint have an influence on their disposition as well as on their constitution? Their first sentiment is a sentiment of pain and suffering. They find only obstacles to all movements which they need. (1762/1979, 43)

As seen in Rousseau's theory of self-love, inappropriate imposed restriction prevents the child from learning about his abilities and inabilities. It goes against his natural inclination of

perfectibilité. It teaches him that he is unable to accomplish his aims and desires independently; it teaches him that he either must accept that he cannot continue to develop and form or that he must depend on others to do it.

In another example, that of a child's tears, Rousseau reveals how restricting a child's will, specifically those practices of restriction based in hostility, negatively impacts the child's moral development:

From these tears that we might think so little worthy of attention is born man's first relation to all that surrounds him; here is formed the first link in that long chain of which the social order is formed. When the child cries, he is uncomfortable; he has some need which he does not know how to satisfy. One examines, one seeks this need, one finds it, one provides for it. When one does not find it or when one cannot provide for it, the tears continue. One is bothered by them, one sings to him to make him go to sleep. If he persists, one gets impatient, one threatens him, brutal nurses sometimes strike him. These are strange lessons for his entrance in life. (1762/1979, 66)

As the example demonstrates, there are three different scenarios of responses to the child's tears. Firstly, the nurturer provides for it, secondly the tears could be ignored or redirected as the nurturer cannot provide for it, and thirdly, the nurturer could meet the tears with abuse. Rousseau explains that when the first tears of a child gain a response met with kindness, fulfillment and respect, the child learns that he is loved and cared-for (Rousseau, 1762/1979, 66). He also learns that his tears and the process of crying work for his self-preservation. He feels accomplished because he labored his way to get his needs met. When his tears do not win him a response or are met with hostility, anger, suppression or restriction, he cries louder and with more command because he is confused. He questions his nature and, over time, he learns that his efforts are not successful at getting his needs met and that his capabilities have failed him. It is here that resentment, anger, and fury arise. The child becomes frustrated with his immature

abilities and the people around him. He learns that he must find another way to have his needs met. As a result, he learns to manipulate others and achieve his needs by force. His ego emerges and he develops a self-love based in egocentrism. Now, as Rousseau describes, the child will work from a place of negative *amour-propre* fueled by anger, and his tears will now function as orders and demands. His *amour de soi-même* is not being cultivated and so his self-love develops negatively and far away from connecting to his nature and humanness. Allan Bloom explains Rousseau's notion of the effects of anger on self-love:

Anger is caused by intentional wrong, and the child learns to see intention to do wrong in that which opposes him...If he gets what he wants he is a master. If he fails, he is angry, resentful, and likely to become slavish. In either event he has entered into a dialectic of mastery and slavery which will occupy him for his whole life. His natural and healthy self-love and self-esteem [*amour de soi-même*] gives way to a self-love relative to other men's opinions of him [*amour-propre*]; henceforth he can esteem himself only if others esteem him. Ultimately he makes the impossible demand that others care for him more than they care for themselves. (1979, 11)

For all these reasons, the child engages in egocentric inquiry such as, "Why can't I have what I want?". He begins to think competitively and make judgments and comparisons about his accomplishments and those of others. He compares himself with others, and he learns to perceive others through the lens of jealousy and envy, "Why does he get what he wants?". Indeed, resentment and anger occupy his space of self-love and this precludes moral development.

Rousseau's point is to make educators realize that restricting a child's will is actually a form of imposing their own will upon the child. Indeed, this forms a negative teacher-learner relationship in which the child is 'servant' and the educator is 'master'. When a child interacts with his surroundings authentically and there is no interference by another will, he comes to

accept causes, effects, and impacts with ease, even if these effects were not the outcome he wanted: “As long as children find resistance in things and never in wills, they will become neither rebellious nor irascible and will preserve their health better” (Rousseau 1762/1979, 66). Moreover, the child develops an understanding of how his will may be redirected due to natural consequences of the situation. Within these natural experiences, anger, revenge, jealousy, resentment, are not aroused within the child. He does not see himself as having to compete for what he wants as there is no one else in his way. On the contrary, he understands what to have happened as having no other cause than nature herself.

1.2 *Amour de Soi-même* Complemented by *Amour-Propre* Founded on Self-Love, Pity, and Compassion

The aim of moral education is for *amour de soi-même* to be the driving mechanism that guides behavior. At the same time, it's important to note that, when cultivated at the appropriate time, that is, following the development of *amour de soi-même*, *amour-propre* can have a positive moral function. In the education of Emile, Rousseau was firm in expressing that events and learning experiences ought to be timed to his development and ability. Emile should develop *amour de soi-même* first, and only when a curiosity stirred within him about others would he be ready to understand and develop *amour-propre*. Following this model, the virtues of pity and compassion rather than anger and competitiveness can develop. These two virtues, which I discuss next, are needed to understand and develop a positive *amour-propre*.

Rousseau claimed that when *amour de soi-même* is “directed by man in reason and modified by pity” (Rousseau 1755/1992, 90, note 15), his humanity and respect for others is cultivated. Here we learn that one's moral deliberation is not solely a function of reason, but rather included with self-sentiment. In *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality* (1755), Rousseau

describes how reason needs to be complemented by pity, compassion, and self-love in order for one's moral capacity to be realized. He describes how reason on its own, can keep an individual from identifying him- or herself with someone who is suffering. Through reason, a person could make an argument outlining the reasons why he or she shouldn't feel for the sufferer⁹. Thus, acting through reason alone does not necessarily lead us to recognize and respect others. At the same time, Rousseau is not saying that we do not need reason for morality. In fact, he is saying that we need to combine reason with pity and compassion cultivated through self-love to lead us to recognize and respect others. He states that "savage man does not have this admirable talent [reason], and for lack of wisdom and reason he is always seen thoughtlessly giving in to the first sentiment of humanity [pity]" (1755/1992, 38). Rousseau is suggesting that while we cannot act on reason alone, we also cannot act on sentiment alone. Acting on sentiment alone could project man into a situation in which he might respond without knowing what is possible nor what is necessary, but rather based solely in his instinct and what he wants to do. For Rousseau, this is careless because it could cause harm to oneself, and it would keep man as 'savage' and from perfecting his capabilities (for example, animals follow their instincts and sentiments whereas human beings have the capability to reason, be free in their choices (go against ego), and act upon instinct and sentiment together). Thus, we need a form of *amour-propre*, one that is developed after *amour de soi-même*, that embraces reason and both pity and compassion.

Rousseau proposes that both reason and self-sentiment have fundamental roles in one's moral education. He states,

Reason is what engenders egocentrism, and reflection strengthens it. Reason is what turns man in upon himself. Reason is what separates him from all that troubles him and afflicts him... Philosophy is what isolates him and what moves him to say in secret, at

⁹ See Rousseau (1755/1992, 37-38).

the sight of a suffering man, ‘Perish if you will; I am safe and sound.’ No longer can anything but danger to the entire society trouble the tranquil slumber of the philosopher and yank him from his bed. His fellow man can be killed with impunity underneath his window. He has merely to place his hands over his ears and argue with himself a little in order to prevent nature, which rebels within him, from identifying him with the man being assassinated. (Rousseau 1755/1992, 37-38)

Rousseau’s maxim for a moral education does not echo the ‘golden rule’ or what he calls ‘reasoned justice’, *Do unto others as you would have them do unto you* (1755/1992, 38). Rather, Rousseau proposes a maxim that values the role of reason, self-love, and pity and compassion: *Do what is good for you with the least possible harm to others* (1755/1992, 38). In the latter maxim, there is a clear focus on the self without needing to involve the opinions of others, while at the same time considering pity and the connection to humanity and the human condition. In the former maxim, the focus is on the other person and implores a will that is directed at having others act in such a way that meets the individual’s demand, thus supporting the cycle of master and slave (as I described earlier). Indeed, if we act according to Rousseau’s maxim, while taking into account the importance of reason, we will realize that pity and compassion –as virtues that help connect us to our humanness- also help define our moral duty not to harm others: “It is therefore quite certain that pity is a natural sentiment, which, by moderating in each individual the activity of the love of oneself [*amour de soi-même*], contributes to the mutual preservation of the entire species” (Rousseau 1755/1992, 37-38). Thus, Rousseau’s notion of self-love as part of moral development underscores the human capacity to consider others in all decisions to act. Each individual must realize that he can fulfill his needs through his abilities and strengths while at the same time connecting with how his actions affect others on a human level. This entails reflecting upon and finding reasons as to why or why not his actions relate to the good.

While pity helps weave the fabric of a productive *amour-propre* and teaches man to connect with another human being by feeling his own humanity, compassion is the other thread that teaches man to love another fellow human. Compassion involves imagining another person's position in life. Philosopher Martha Nussbaum explains that compassion requires recognition of another person and also a sense of one's vulnerability to misfortune. She states: "It is true that human beings are needy, incomplete creatures who are in many ways dependent on circumstances beyond their control for the possibility of well-being. As Rousseau argues in *Emile*, people do not fully grasp that fact until they can imagine suffering vividly to themselves, and feel pain in the imagining" (1997, 90).¹⁰ With compassion, man realizes that he feels and wants what another wants. That is, he connects as a member of a species and he senses that he needs other human beings. He becomes sensitive to the feelings of others and he realizes that others are like him. He begins to reflect upon where he stands in the social order and he compares his situation to those of others. However, as I have argued, this only occurs when the individual has gained a sense of his own capacity and his own fallibility by developing *amour de soi-même*.

In conclusion, Rousseau's theory of *amour de soi-même* and *amour-propre* in moral education is significant for understanding how learners develop morally and this has in some sense been forgotten in educational discourse and practice today. For Rousseau, the type of self-love a person develops from experiences, that of *amour de soi-même* and *amour-propre*, is what structures a person's will and determines their ability to morally interact with others. Indeed, one whose will is structured first from *amour de soi-même*, a self-love based in self-preservation, modified by *amour-propre* based in pity and compassion, can act in such a way as

¹⁰ Allan Bloom also emphasizes that compassion "requires imagination and *amour-propre* in addition to the instinct for self-preservation [*amour de soi-même*]. Moreover, [compassion] cannot withstand the demands of one's own self-preservation. It is a tender plant, but one which will bear sweet fruit if properly cultivated" (1979, 18).

to not cause harm to himself and others. On the contrary, the learner that has a will structured from *amour-propre* based in ego, acts competitively, values himself more than others, and neglects those moral maxims that respect others.

Looking to the contemporary educational context, we can see that Rousseau's theory of self-love has three significant implications for moral education. First, the educational ethos of a learning environment cannot be one based in imposed restriction that demands a learner's conformity or engenders a battle of wills between teacher and learner. The teacher must exercise a genuine interest in the learner's needs, wants, and desires, and allow the learner to have experiences in which these can be understood and realized. Second, morality, as Rousseau reminds us, cannot develop through reason alone. Thus simple exercises and experiences of 'thinking about' or reasoning what one ought or ought not to do are insufficient for promoting moral development. Finally, for an environment to be morally educational, it must cultivate the human sentiments of pity and compassion. The learner must connect with his own humanity and use this connection to feel love for another. It is this love that teaches him that his own wellness benefits from the wellness of others. It is only through reasoning *and* feeling that the learner will cultivate a sense of humanity and morality.

At the heart of Rousseau's thinking is the idea that seeing oneself as an end is interconnected to seeing others as ends in themselves, rather than as a means to an end. I consider this idea further in the next section on Herbart.

1.3 Johann F. Herbart on Morality as the Whole Purpose of Education

Johann Friedrich Herbart's educational theory states that "the one and the whole work of education may be summed up in the concept –Morality" (1902, 57). On this account, education is viewed as a cultivation of humanity, and for that reason it has an intrinsically moral sense. Herbart is arguing that moral education begins with developing how the individual views his or her own humanness. We can say that Herbart is drawing on Rousseau's notions of *amour de soi-même* and *amour-propre*, which I discussed above. For both Herbart and Rousseau, it is only when an individual can connect with his or her own humanness that he or she can imagine and connect with others. My focus in this section is on one particular concept in Herbart's work, namely the concept of *inner freedom*. This concept provides us with further insight into what is necessary for understanding a form of moral education that develops one's understanding of one's own humanness. I close the chapter with a discussion of central aspects of the teacher's task in cultivating the learner's inner freedom.

1.3.1 The Inner Censor as a Key Concept in Moral Education

In *The Science of Education: Its General Principles Deduced from its Aim and the Aesthetic Revelation of the World* (1902), Herbart's theory of education can be viewed as extending Rousseau's theory of freedom and the will. With Herbart, we can narrow our focus to the cultivation of inner freedom, which involves the inner censor, which tells one what not to do, and functions as self-guidance for moral action. His work helps us to understand that freedom of the will includes *self-restriction*. In this way, Herbart's work makes an important point for educators to understand: freedom does not mean one can do whatever one desires, but rather it

involves the ability to restrict oneself from indulging in one's wants selfishly and without concern for others¹¹.

For Herbart, to act according to one's inner freedom, or *Innere Freiheit*¹², one must have a will that is structured from the inclinations, desires, and passions. Freedom of this nature involves the learner to self-restrict or censor him or herself. This idea of freedom recognizes that an individual has a choice to act or not act upon his or her will. For Herbart, morality is judgment that proceeds from the learner's inner freedom, not from arbitrary restrictions by others, intimidation, fear, or promise of rewards:

If we think of the power, and the resistance as well, with which a human being maintains this good will erect in himself against those movements of the emotions and desires working in opposition to it, then morality, which was merely an *attribute*, a *determination* of the will, becomes to us the virtue, power, action, and efficacy of the will so determined. Distinct from both is what belongs to legality, *i.e.* the right comprehension of moral law, and different again from the knowledge of general law, and even of the knowledge of ordinary and recognized rules of duty in common life, is the proper judgment by the individual of that which in special cases, in particular moments, in his

¹¹ See English, *Discontinuity and Learning* (2013, 9): "An individual's choice to listen to the voice of the moral imperative and act *against* self-interest and *toward* the other is an act of 'inner freedom' (*Innere Freiheit*) that Herbart views as an essential aspect of all human beings and, significantly, one over which educators have influence."

¹² Inner Freedom is the first of five aesthetic relations that Herbart expands upon in his theory of ethics. The others are, *Vollkommenheit* (*Perfection*), which commands one to act, *Wohllollen* (*Benevolence*), which commands one to act with benevolence towards an imagined other will, *Recht* (*Right*), which commands one to make agreements with another will when a conflict arises, and *Billigkeit* (*Requital*), which commands one to make good on intentionally or unintentionally broken agreements. As Dunkel explains, the aim of education becomes the production of a will which stands in the proper relation in each of these five instances (Dunkel 1970, 89). Herbart views judgments that are based in these relations as judgments of taste. There is an aesthetic necessity to follow them: "We must add here that when a judgement of taste breaks forth from the depth of the mind, it will, thanks to the nature of its origin, be often felt as a power which does not properly lie in what it utters...but the judgement remains, and it is its slow pressure which men call conscience. Finding then original practical, that is aesthetic necessity, the moral individual controls his desire in order to obey this necessity. The desire then was a link in an aesthetic relationship. And as far as the same desire is in him, which exists in the relationships judged, so far does the individual in his contemplation turn his glance inward upon himself" (Herbart 1902, 66). My focus in this section of the thesis is only on the notion of Inner Freedom, which provides the basis for the other 4 relations. For more on Herbart's five relations see Dunkel (1970, 97); and, English (2013).

immediate contact with human beings and destiny, is to be done, chosen, or avoided, as the best, as the true and only good. (1902, 58)

A person is truly free in that his actions are his own because they are motivated by his will and mediated by his inner censor.

Herbart describes the good will as “the steady resolution of a man to consider himself as an individual under the law which is universally binding” (1902, 57). It includes the development of an inner censor which aids in directing one’s will morally. Herbart’s notion of the inner freedom is also directly related with the idea of freedom and the will as put forth in Immanuel Kant’s notion of the Categorical Imperative: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant 1785/1956, 96). For Kant, the ability to reason and be rational must exist within the individual so that he may imagine and reflect upon his will and actions. This skill is what enables him to *know* what is good and what is not. For Herbart, the formation of the inner censor comes about through an agreement of experiencing and reasoning. That is, it is a coming together and conversation of reason and aesthetic revelation: “The individual must contemplate his whole position in the world from a moral point of view; he must tell himself how his highest interest can be favoured or harmed by circumstances. He must reinforce the practical view with the theoretical; he must act accordingly” (Herbart 1902, 209). In this way, we learn from Herbart that moral action involves both reason *and* feeling. The aim of a moral education is for the rational and aesthetic to become a powerful dyad that work to preserve humanity by guiding actions to respect, value, and maintain humanness.

Herbart adds to Kant's insight, that every individual also needs to develop what we can call a moral compass that connects the individual with his own humanness so that he may sympathize and empathize with the humanness of others. This moral compass is what signals an individual to turn his glance inward upon himself, forming a self-self relation in the contemplation of what to do or not to do. This self-self relation, when formed through educative experiences and derived from recognizing a self-love based in preservation, pity, and compassion, is the seed that gives fruit to the actions and objects of what one considers good. Through education, an individual creates what Herbart calls "a warmth for the good," which is a individual's warmth towards that which sympathizes with, preserves, and respects humanness¹³.

Although she is not citing Herbart, philosopher Martha Nussbaum (1997) argues for a reform of education that leads one to self-realization and requires self-examination in a way that connects to Herbart and Rousseau. Self-realization, or better defined in the Socratic approach of 'know thyself', is what Rousseau describes in the education of Emile, and it is what Herbart is arguing for when he describes the formation of character that is founded on cultivating an inner warmth for the good. Emile's education included reasoning and acquiring knowledge, but it also entailed of knowing his own humanness. As I described at the beginning of this chapter, for Rousseau it was necessary for Emile to have experiences by which he 'learns' his own qualities, capabilities, intentions, and desires, and which thereby lead him to understand and know love, pity, and compassion. Nussbaum argues that we are just beginning to realize the Socratic mission "really questioning *everyone*, recognizing *everyone's* humanity" (1997, 31). On my

¹³ See JF Herbart (1902, 248): "Warding off outward cold does not mean increasing inward warmth; but, on the contrary, moral warmth arises for the most part out of true work and conflict, in which already existent power is gradually firmly established through the stings of external ill." Also see English (2013).

view, the pathway of a holistic moral education involves not only developing reasoning and the capacity for logical analysis but also an inner warmth for the good.

1.4 Reflections on the Teacher's Task: Awakening a Moral Interest

On the view I am putting forward here, moral education must afford the learner opportunities to reflect on his own thinking, question his assumptions, form arguments that transcend bias and stereotypes, and in doing so develop compassion. When applying these concepts in moral education to a modern educational context, the teacher must consider that the moral development of the learner should involve natural experiences for both the rational and aesthetic selves. Put another way, the duty of the teacher is to provide experiences for the learner to learn to justify his own actions, feel his desires, reflect upon the consequences (through both *reason* and *feeling*), and imagine future possibilities.

Such experiences, initiated by the teacher, but experienced by the learner, ought to allow the learner opportunities to understand the humanness of others and not place her in situations where she feels above (or below) others. These experiences ought not to be experiences that throw her ego under the unduly harsh judgement, blame, and disapproval of others, but rather get her to consider the 'reproof' of others "without making it repugnant by mortifying additions" (Herbart 1902, 247). Herbart explains,

But it [her own censorship] will be interfered with by every strong and lasting stimulus that gives prominence to the *feeling of self*, and thus makes the individual self the point of reference for the world outside it. Either joy or pain may be such a stimulus. The latter occurs in disease and sickness, even in merely very excitable temperaments, and teachers have long known that moral development suffers under it. The same result will follow upon harsh treatment, exaggerated teasing, or neglect of that care which is due to the needs of children. In contrast with this we rightly advise the gratification of the natural joyfulness of children. With equal reason again, education discourages everything which

stimulates prominence of the individual self through feelings of pleasure; everything, that is, which satisfies the desires without a use, which encourages the premature development of wishes that belong to later years, everything which fosters conceit and selfishness. (1902, 246-247)

The idea that experiences ought not to foster conceit and selfishness aligns with Rousseau's notion of the premature development of *amour-propre*. Herbart agrees, those experiences, either painful or pleasurable, that fuel the ego do not aid in the formation of moral character. Rather, they form a character based in ego, inconsiderate of pity and compassion, and driven by serving one's self interest without considering the humanness of others.

Learning to care for and connect to other human beings is interconnected with what Martha Nussbaum calls awakening one's moral interest. She states, "It is impossible to care about the characters and their well-being, without having some very definite political and moral interests awakened in oneself" (1997, 104). This awakening of one's moral interest is what I am calling the teacher's central task in moral education¹⁴. This involves creating experiences for the learner that connect him with his *self* and "throw him under his own censorship" (Herbart 1902, 246) in such a way that does not bolster or fuel the ego. The teacher must always be conscious of the intentions and possible outcomes of the experiences she is providing in the classroom. She must constantly be asking herself, "Do these experiences connect learners with their human selves and promote perceiving the humanness in others?" Or, "Do these experiences put 'prominence on the self?'"

Like we saw in *Emile* (1762), the teacher is a careful orchestrator of events that set the learner up for opportunities to think, feel, reflect, and change: "Let him see, let him feel the

¹⁴ Green, M. "Wide awakesness and the moral life (Ch. 3). Landscapes of Learning." (1978).

human calamities” (Rousseau 1762/1979, 224). For Herbart, this involves that the teacher “...will try to guide not the reins, but the hand that holds the reins” (Herbart 1902, 267). When the teacher guides the learner’s hand, that is, his judgement, rather than his ‘reins’ or will, he or she is structuring his education in a way that is based in freedom and autonomy. For the learner will realize that because he has developed self-love by connecting to his own humanness, he can not only *rationalize* and make moral decisions, but he knows what he ought to do because it also *feels* good and right. He understands not to use others as a means to an end, and he can problem solve, think, reflect, and imagine, all on his own.

As noted by Andrea English (2011), the teacher as moral guide on Herbart’s model, engages in a dialogue that interrupts the learner’s pathway of thinking and acting:

On this view, moral guidance entails a form of dialogue with the learner through which the teacher questions the learner in a manner that leads the learner to question him- or herself, that is, to question his or her own assumptions and motives for action. In this way, dialogue with the learner involves *interrupting* the learner’s taken-for-granted modes of thinking and acting in a way that cultivates the learner’s *inner struggle*¹⁵, so that the learner begins to develop an inner censor. (178)

In this way, we can say that the teacher appeals to both the learner’s rational and aesthetic (emotional, sensual) selves. Through this process, by *listening* to the learner in all moral capacities, the teacher not only guides the learner but ultimately teaches the learner how to listen to and guide him or herself. In this context, moral guidance requires a skilled teacher and one that acts with the learner.

¹⁵ See Gartmeier, Bauer, Gruber, Heid, *Negative Knowledge: Understanding Professional Learning and Expertise* (2008), and English (2013).

For Herbart, education is a path that moves the learner from acting in such a way as to serve his ego towards a direction of acting in consideration of the humanness of others:

“A making which the pupil himself discovers when choosing the good and rejecting the bad –this or nothing is formation of character! This rise to self-conscious personality ought without doubt to take place in the mind of the pupil himself, and be completed through his own activity; it would be nonsense if the teacher desired to create the real essence of the power to do it, and to pour it into the soul of his pupil.” (1902, 61)

When the learner discovers that he is choosing the good, as described above, this means that the learner is choosing from a place of being connected to his own humanness, a place of self-love and respect of others aligned with inner freedom and the other relations of the will¹⁶. The learner must find himself within this connection, whether pleasant or unpleasant, to be in a place for self-transformation. When this feeling is pleasant, the learner knows what to do with ease, and when this feeling is an inner struggle, the choosing becomes more multifaceted and difficult. It becomes difficult because the learner is faced with choosing his ego or following his inner censor/warmth for the good¹⁷. However, these moments of inner struggle are important because they set the stage for self-transformation and also the potential for the learner to choose right: “in order for the learner to begin to see himself differently –that is, to see that he is capable of thinking, judging, and acting in ways that respect the other –some of his attempts of moral action must succeed” (English 2013, 41). It is within this multifaceted condition, when the learner independently makes a moral decision, that the true formation of character happens.

¹⁶ For more on Herbart’s five relations see Dunkel 1970, 97; and, English (2013).

¹⁷ See English, *Discontinuity and Learning* (2013, 8): “When we experience inner struggle, it is because our past decisions come into conflict with the demands of the present situation –thus, our objective side comes into conflict with our subjective side. Inner struggle marks the point at which we can make changes in the way we act in the world.”

Herbart proposes a learning model that strives to cultivate and recognize the inner struggle of the learner because he understands that it is here, in the moment of looking back and not knowing where to go, that the learner changes his being, where he forms his character, and where he *learns*. Within a formal educational context, it is the duty of the teacher to provide an environment where this self-transformation, or what Herbart calls the formation of character, where one can choose the good based in his own self-self relation and without the influence of rewards, fear, or punishment, can be realized. This context would allow the teacher the space to go into the struggle with the learner and guide him to reflect on what he knows, make judgements about what he knows, and realize the range of possibilities of what he can do. As this chapter demonstrates, there is a connection between one's self-understanding and the way one treats others. Moreover, as I have highlighted through my readings of Rousseau and Herbart, it is precisely the relationship one has with oneself that is directly connected to how one treats others. To act in a moral way means to treat others with dignity and demonstrate an unconditional respect for human life. This way of being is based upon *both* a certain type of self-self relation that includes a self-censor and the rational maxims that command an individual to act in such a way as to not cause harm to others.

It is through this teacher-learner interaction that the learner comes to consider how acting from ego limits his possibilities; for, in this case, the only possibilities to consider are those that serve himself and not the human condition of others. By guiding the learner into a *range of possibilities*, the teacher is allowing him the space to consider a new path, one that recognizes and values the humanness in others. Indeed, 'talking at' the learner about what is right and what is wrong is insufficient. The teacher must meet the learner during his time of inner struggle and dialogue with him in such a way that evokes emotion, reflection, connection to his self, and

imagination. This is what provides the space for transformation. As Herbart argues, the learner has to *feel* his way through experience and not simply ‘think’ about it. This is what connects him to his own self-love and inner censor.

Herbart argues that the teacher must have a certain tact to create a learning space that compliments the five relations¹⁸. He, or she, must have core assumptions about the learner, one of which is that he is a person worthy of dignity and respect, and as having needs, wants, and desires different than her own. For, as stated by Herbart when describing the overbearing teacher who restricts the inner freedom of the learner, “character is inner stability, but how can a human being take root in himself, when he is not allowed to depend on anything, when you do not permit him to trust a single decision to his own will?” (1902, 85). Being careful not to interfere with the learner’s will in such a way as to prohibit inner freedom ought to be a foremost concern of the teacher. Moreover, as I will discuss in the next section with Dewey, it is the teacher’s foremost duty to create a learning space that supports the inner freedom of the learner; that which is not imposed by removal of restrictions, but rather fostered intrinsically within the individual by way of restrictions¹⁹. This means that the teacher must only seek to have influence over the learner’s freedom of choice: “...*that* freedom of choice which we all find in ourselves, which we honour as the most beautiful phenomenon in ourselves, and would fain exalt among the other phenomenon of ourselves –this it is which the tutor strives to influence and firmly grasp” (Herbart 1902, 61). The teacher must have a repertoire of skills and strategies to be able to affect a learner in this way. He or she must understand the will as requiring freedom to

¹⁸ For more on Herbart’s five relations see Dunkel (1970, 97); and, English (2013). I will speak more on the concept of tact in Chapter Five with Max van Manen.

¹⁹ Also see Wyner, Nancy. “Teaching Self-Discipline: Democratizing the Classroom through Law-Related Education.” (1976).

develop a self-love built on pity and compassion. The teacher must allow a learner to act upon his will without influence (rewards or punishments, for example) and provide him with guidance during his inner struggle and after the consequences and impacts are known, felt, and experienced.

Educating in this way may be considered closely aligned with what Nussbaum calls educating the global citizen:

As Heraclitus said 2,500 years ago, ‘Learning about many things does not produce understanding.’ Marcus Aurelius insisted that to become world citizens we must not simply amass knowledge; we must also cultivate in ourselves a capacity for sympathetic imagination that will enable us to comprehend the motives and choices of people different than ourselves, seeing them not as forbiddingly alien and other, but as sharing many problems and possibilities with us. (1997, 85)

On my view, the aim of moral education is for the learner to realize that he is a free being capable of self-directed decisions that recognize and respect others.

On this account, we move to understand the environment of an educational context as a place that affirms the learner as a learning being. In this educational context, the learner is not an object to be taught, but rather a person to be discovered²⁰. Within a space that promotes this discovery, the teacher will see a learning being that makes accuracies and errors, a person that gets excited and frustrated. The teacher will discover a being who doesn’t like the same things as him or herself, nor a being who wants to learn the same things as him or herself. He or she will discover a being who has his or her own interests and aims and he or she will discover a

²⁰ See Maxine Greene *Teacher as Stranger* (1973, 197): “The teacher is continually being asked (at least obliquely) to write a pious and authoritative role for himself or herself and submissive or savage or special roles for the young people he or she teaches. One has to make a deliberate effort to realize that no role can fully encompass a personality, just as no slogan or abstraction or popular phrase can do justice to a human situation.”

being who can engage in self-transformation and reflection. Herbart is asking us to evolve from a model of education where the teacher works to either control the will of the learner and/or save the learner from bad choices and inner struggle, towards a model that embraces an environment where school is a place that allows learners to experience being wrong as part of their search for what is right and good. The importance of the teacher being present in moments of inner struggle is highlighted throughout Herbart's work. I now turn to John Dewey to further examine this special type of environment that allows for the self-transformation of the learner.

Chapter 2: John Dewey and the Context of Moral Education

...the only way in which adults consciously control the kind of education which the immature get is by controlling the environment in which they act, and hence think and feel. We never educate directly, but indirectly by means of environment²¹. - Dewey

2.1 The Educational Context

A democratic learning environment, as claimed by John Dewey, is one that allows each individual the capacity to develop his or her thoughts, desires, and purpose²². And, as we learned with Rousseau's Emile, guidance and care must be focused on each individual learner. Thus, the teacher becomes a personal tutor for each student and attends to his or her individual thoughts, desires, and purpose, while controlling the environment in which the learner learns. The aim of moral education is to construct a good will and have the learner live his life with the guide of an inner censor that demonstrates a warmth for the good. Dewey agrees with Rousseau and Herbart that there are certain types of experiences generated within the democratic educational context that shape the structuring of a good will. He also contends that teachers heavily influence this structuring by controlling and manipulating the environment of where the experiences unfold. For this reason, it is the teacher's understanding of freedom and how to set up a learning environment that comprise the most important elements in providing the learner's education.

Thus, the teacher must be knowledgeable of not only what is moral education but also in ways he or she can set up a space that compliments the experiences that fund the development of a good will. It is this learning space where the child learns about him or herself and about others. Moreover, it is within this educational context that the learner problem solves and develops

²¹ See Dewey (1909/2010, 14).

²² See Dewey (1938/1997, 61): "The commonest mistake made about freedom is, I think, to identify it with freedom of movement, or with external or physical side of activity. Now, this external and physical side of activity cannot be separated from the internal side of activity; from freedom of thought, desire, and purpose."

relationships with his natural and social surroundings. It is here that he or she will further develop a good will and a warmth for the good. For these reasons, the teacher must create a space that allows for freedom and experience. And, as Dewey suggests, a democratic learning context, one where freedom is embraced and certain experiences are carefully planned and facilitated, allows for the learner to maneuver his way through both his personal and social advances and engage in a moral education.

In his essay *Democracy in Education* (1903), Dewey describes democracy as “freeing intelligence for independent effectiveness –the emancipation of mind as an individual organ to do its own work” (1903/2010, 144). He continues, “We naturally associate democracy, to be sure, with freedom of action, but freedom of action without freed capacity of thought behind it is only chaos. If external authority in action is given up, it must be because internal authority of truth, discovered and known to reason, is substituted” (Dewey 1903/2010, 144). On this account, democracy is directed at each individual; a personal liberty that includes not only freedom of action, but freedom of thought. In terms of the educational context, democracy requires that the learning environment must yield to the freely expressed will of each individual learner and encourage freedom of intelligence (thought, desire, and purpose) through experience.

Freedom of intelligence, as a Platonic concept emerging during the time of enlightenment, allows for the individual to think for him or herself. In providing an inquiry into Socratic educational theory, Martha Nussbaum quotes Seneca in that “*liberalis*, or as we might literally render it, ‘freelike’, is one that makes its pupils free, able to take charge of their own thought and to conduct a critical examination of their society’s norms and traditions” (1997, 30). Taking care of your own thought, as described above, is an allowance that manifests its integrity in voicing opinions and forming judgments. It allows for criticism, difference, and creativity.

Freedom of intelligence and the allowance of being able to think about the world in one's own way must be realized in the classroom.

The direction and allowance of the learner's will is greatly governed by the teacher and his or her relationship with the learner. Indeed, all the materials, resources, curriculum, physical set-up, and experiences of the classroom should be aimed at freedom. However, Dewey identifies that the structure of the educational system is problematic for presenting a democratic learning context to learners. And, to reiterate, a democratic educational context, one that allows for the true freedom of intelligence, which fundamentally allows for the freedom of the will, is the systemic principle on which a moral education is found. This democratic principle must also be present *beneath* the learner's learning context. That is, it must be the founding principle for the teacher's workplace, as it is this very workplace that also defines the educational context for the learner.

Dewey argues that in a traditional education system, the teacher cannot freely set up experiences catered to the thoughts, desires, and purpose of the learner. He makes clear that the teacher struggles in developing the learner's freedom of intelligence because she is not able to utilize her own:

The dictation, in theory at least, of the subject-matter to be taught, to the teacher who is to engage in the actual work of instruction, and frequently, under the name of close supervision, the attempt to determine the methods which are to be used in teaching, mean nothing more or less than the deliberate restriction of intelligence, the imprisoning of the spirit. Every well-graded system of schools in this country rejoices in a course of study. It is no uncommon thing to find methods of teaching such subjects as reading, writing, spelling, and arithmetic officially laid down; outline topics in history and geography are provided ready-made for the teacher... We may thank our heavens, however, that the practice is rarely as bad as the theory would require. Superintendents and principals often encourage individuality and thoughtfulness in the invention and adoption of methods of teaching; and they wink at departures from the printed manual of study. It

remains true, however, that this great advance is personal and informal. It depends upon the wisdom and tact of the individual supervisory official; he may withdraw his concession at any moment; or it may be ruthlessly thrown aside by his successor who has formed a high ideal of 'system'. (Dewey 1903/2010, 146-147)

For these reasons, the teacher is greatly challenged to establish freedom through experience for the learner. As long as the teacher is bound to government curriculum and topics, he or she cannot embrace the full direction of the learner's will. And, as suggested by Dewey, it is only those teachers who *choose* to sway outside the lines of bureaucracy that can provide an education closer to what he is describing.

2.1.2 Freedom and Experience in the Classroom

In his essay, *Progressive Education and Science of Education* (1928), Dewey claims that the method of teaching is "no longer a question of how the teacher is to instruct or how the pupil is to study. The problem is to find what conditions must be fulfilled in order that study and learning will naturally and necessarily take place, what conditions must be present so that pupils will make the responses which cannot help having learning as their consequence" (Dewey 1928/2010, 185). The teacher needs to have the freedom to cooperate with the will and desires of each learner to ensure an authentic learning process. The only way this can happen is through a system that understands the teacher and learner as human beings; free, unpredictable, curious, willing, having a warmth for the good, and capable of learning, reflecting, and growing.

Dewey's notion of the teacher in creating the classroom environment harkens back to Socratic ideals of education. Martha Nussbaum clarifies: "The most important ingredient of a Socratic classroom is obviously the instructor. No curricular formula will take the place of

provocative and perceptive teaching that arouses the mind” (1997, 41). The learning environment, including the elements of learning resources, physical space, and overall ethos is controlled and fashioned by the teacher. And, it is the arousal of each individual’s mind that Dewey suggests happens indirectly through the educational context and learning experiences.

Dewey maintains that “in education meet the three most powerful motives of human activity” (Dewey 1903/2010, 151); namely, those of affection (sympathy and affection towards a child), social growth (interest in the welfare of society), and scientific inquiry (interest in knowledge, scholarship, and truth for its own sake)²³. On this account, freedom and experience would include a catalogue of domains ranging from both inside and outside the classroom; the natural, practical, social, scientific, and artistic. These domains provide a place for the learner to develop and understand relationships, care for others and the world, and embrace his natural curiosity. By focusing on these powerful motives of human activity, as noted above by Dewey, teachers will naturally and authentically provide the learner with experiences that compliment his thoughts, desires, and purpose, which inevitably provide the means for him to develop a warmth for the good. And, as Dewey points out, experiences that drive the powerful motives of human activity are the most lacking in schools, but yet they remain the most influential on moral development: “To experiment in the sense of trying things or to see what will happen is the most natural business of the child, indeed, his chief concern. It is one which the school has largely wither ignored or actually suppressed, so that it has been forced to find outlet in mischief or even in actually destructive ways” (Dewey 1903/2010, 151). For Dewey, education is a “reconstruction of experience” (1938/1997, 87) and it must begin with the impulse of the learner.

²³ See Dewey’s essay *Democracy in Education* (1903) in Simpson, Douglas J., and Sam F. Stack, eds. *Teachers, leaders, and schools: Essays by John Dewey*. SIU Press, 2010.

An experience must be presented, charged with the elements of human motivation, that allows the learner to use his impulse as a springboard to further his knowledge and moral sensibility. The teacher must craft this experience for the learner and have foresight on where it may lead him and where he needs to be taken. This keeps the experience meaningful and it allows for freedom; that is, the space for the learner's will to go in many directions is provided, and, at the same time, his self-knowledge and connection to his own humanness is cultivated.

The aim of education is to ensure that the learner becomes self-directed and self-determined, rather than have an obedience of mind. The experiences that happen within the educational learning space need to be met with democratic intention, or freedom of intelligence. As Dewey states, "The mind, to be sure, is that of a child, and yet, after all, it is mind. To subject mind to an outside and ready-made material is a denial of the ideal of democracy, which roots itself ultimately in the principle of moral, self-directing individuality" (Dewey 1903/2010, 148). Indeed, what Dewey is suggesting is that schools be a place for getting and testing experience where the experience is provoked by the will, thoughts, desires, and purpose of the child. An education of this sort is democratic in nature and leads to moral development.

2.1.3 The Development of the Self-Self Relation through Reflection and Educative Experiences

Dewey is introducing educators to the importance of setting up a space where the learner can stop and think about him or herself; that is, his connection to his own humanness, his experiences, where he has been, where he is, and where he wants to go. This interruption, in its

most natural sense, is reflection and it leads to the development of the self-self relation²⁴. The learner needs to test his experiences and then *rationalize* and *feel* the personal, social, and moral implications²⁵. In his work *Moral Principles in Education* (1909), Dewey makes a clear distinction between teaching morals and teaching about morals. We learn from Dewey that direct instruction to teach about what is and what is not good character is ineffective; "...it may be laid down as fundamental that the influence of direct moral instruction, even at its very best, is *comparatively* small in amount and slight in influence, when the whole field of moral growth through education is taken into account" (1909/2009, 17). A learning space where the teacher tells the learner hypothetical consequences to his actions will only provoke more curiosity while hampering the direction and intention of his will. Alas, sheet work and 'talking at' learners about good character, along with other cognitive exercises in isolation do not cultivate moral sensibility. And, as we have seen in the theories of Rousseau and Herbart, simply telling the learner what is good and bad is not effective in developing the learner's self-self relation²⁶.

These types of exercises control the learning environment in an undemocratic way. The teacher not only decides for the learner what is good and what is not, but also informs him or her about what he or she will do. Dewey is suggesting that teachers allow for a more experiential and democratic way of learning. He is offering a discourse on how to structure a learning environment where experiences and interruptions not only happen authentically, but are also reflected upon. This reflection, where the learner looks where he has been, assess where he is at,

²⁴ See Deborah Kerdeman (2003, 305). She explains this interruption as being "pulled up short": "Encounters and events pull us up short only when we acknowledge that they have revealed blind spots or deceptions we prefer to dismiss or ignore."

²⁵ See J. Passmore *On Teaching to be Critical*: Dearden, Robert Frederick, Paul H. Hirst, and Richard Stanley Peters, eds. *Education and the Development of Reason (International Library of the Philosophy of Education Volume 8)*. Routledge, 2009.

²⁶ See Herbart (1902, 85), "Character is inner stability, but how can a human being take root in himself, when he is not allowed to depend on anything, when you do not permit him to trust a single decision to his own will?" Also see Herbart's notion of the inner censor (1902, 58).

and imagines where he ought to go affords him the critical process of experiencing his state cognitively, emotionally, socially, and morally. Without *experiencing* his experience, and engaging only his mind in reasoning about his experience, his learning is merely a cognitive consideration and the interruption does not reach or affect his being.

For Dewey, the forgotten moral aspect of education, that of nurturing the self-self relation, is not achieved through direct teaching about character or intellectual appeal, but rather indirectly through experience:

In this contention [teaching about morals] the teachers *in principle* are in the right; if they are in the wrong, it is not because special periods are not set aside for what after all can only be teaching *about* morals, but because their own character, or their school atmosphere and ideals, or their methods of teaching, or the subject-matter which they teach, are not such *in detail* as to bring intellectual results into vital union with character so that they become working forces in behaviour. (1909/2009, 17)

Dewey suggests that all learning should be aimed at the intellect but emphasizes that it is the *process* and means of *how* the learning is acquired that affects the moral education of the learner. In other words, the intellect of the learner must be stimulated by opportunity, and his or her energy must be channelled towards this capacity, but it must be done in such a way that his or her wellbeing and that of others is considered and, more importantly, experienced.

Education that is moral must combine the learning of the intellect with the learning of experience. Situations of learning must give students something to engage in because engaging in the world leads them to “stop and think” and consider alternatives by encountering the unexpected. Insofar as we have seen Dewey’s argument for a moral education, we know that the learning space must be based in democracy, freedom, and experience. Moreover, this learning space must have a certain quality of experiences and also guide the aims and direction of the

experiences. All of these contexts, both quality and direction of the experiences, provide space for the moral development of the learner. The teacher has an insurmountable job of knowing each student in his or her care. He or she must understand that they are the orchestrator of all the learner's formal educational experiences. For this reason, the teacher must know the value and impact of experience and freedom in connecting the learner to his or her own humanness.

This notion brings to the forefront the importance of reflective experience. Reflective experience is what qualifies the experience and makes it have moral implications. To be reflective, an experience will require one to look back, assess the present, and imagine the range of possibilities of the future. It also takes into account the emotional and physical impacts of the experience. Dewey explains, "To 'learn from experience' is to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence. Under such conditions, doing becomes a trying, and experiment with the world to find out what it is like; the undergoing becomes instruction --discovery of the connection of things" (1916/2005, 83-84). The discovery of the connection of things is what separates the reflective experience from a mere 'accident'. Accidents, according to Dewey, are those experiences that happen to us but do not connect with any prior activity or event²⁷. They do not require us to look back, assess the present, and imagine the future. They are simply happenings that have either been pleasant or not.

The teacher's responsibility is to provide experiences that are reflective in nature. To do this, he or she must know the students in their care and be in tune with their states of being, needs, wants, and desires. This relationship and connection is the starting point of cultivating morality within a learner because "what he already knows functions and has value in what he

²⁷ See Dewey *Democracy and Education* (Stilwell, KS: Digireads 2005, 81).

learns” (Dewey 1916/2005, 89). This is a shift in thinking about the learner as a ‘pupil’ who absorbs knowledge and adds to his collection of trivia towards a ‘being’ who actively constructs his or her own way of knowing the world. The learner must be perceived as thinker and reflector rather than absorber of knowledge²⁸. To think, as Dewey describes, “is the intentional endeavor to discover specific connections between something which we do and the consequences which result, so that the two become continuous” (1916/2005, 87). Reflection is the acceptance to “acknowledge the responsibility for future consequences which flow from present action” (Dewey 1916/2005, 87). Therefore, Dewey is suggesting the importance for learners to think *and* reflect concurrently. When the learner engages in both thinking and reflecting, he actively takes responsibility for his will and subsequent actions. He applies his learning to his present understanding of the world and synthesizes this understanding by reconstructing what he knows so that he can refine what he wants. This type of learning places the learner in a state of interruption, a stop and think moment, where he connects with his own humanness, the humanness of others, and identifies and listens to his moral compass on where he ought to go next.

In closing, I end with this one final thought about experience from Dewey; that of educative and mis-educative experiences. Although experiences are assumed to be educative, Dewey cautions us that not all experiences are of a high learning quality. He contends that an experience is mis-educative when it “has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience” (1938/1997, 25). A mis-educative experience produces lack of sensitivity, lands one in a rut, promotes a careless attitude, is disconnected from the individual, and forms disintegrated

²⁸ See Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (Stilwell, KS: Digireads 2005, 84) : “The very word pupil has almost come to mean one who is engaged in not having fruitful experiences but in absorbing knowledge directly.”

habits²⁹. Such experiences, according to Dewey, restrict rich further experience, narrow the field of further experience, and inhibit the ability to control future experiences³⁰. On the contrary, an educative experience is determined by *quality* and *effect*:

The quality of any experience has two aspects. There is an immediate aspect of agreeableness or disagreeableness, and there is its influence upon later experiences... The *effect* of an experience is not borne on its face. It sets a problem to the educator. It is his business to arrange for the kind of experiences which, while they do not repel the student, but rather engage his activities are, nevertheless, more than immediately enjoyable since they promote having desirable future experiences. (Dewey 1938/1997, 27)

An experience that is educative engages the learner in an interruption and opens up new pathways for him to take. Dewey explains that “Wholly independent of desire and intent, every experience lives on in further experiences. Hence, the central problem of an education based upon experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences” (1938/1997, 28). And, as suggested by Rousseau, Herbart, and Dewey, these experiences spring from the learner’s impulses. The teacher must listen to each learner to learn of what experiences will be educative and which will not:

But what has been said is organically connected with the requirement that experiences in order to be educative must lead out into an expanding world of subject-matter, a subject-matter of facts or information and of ideas. This condition is satisfied only as the educator views teaching and learning as a continuous process of reconstruction of experience. This condition in turn can be satisfied only as the educator has a long look ahead, and views every present experience as a moving force in influencing what future experiences will be. (Dewey 1938/1997, 87)

The aim of moral education is for the learner to construct his own knowledge about what is good and what is not by developing a warmth for the good through experience. This is conducive to

²⁹ See Dewey *Experience and Education* (1938/1997, 26).

³⁰ See Dewey *Experience and Education* (1938/1997, 26).

Herbart's notion of the inner censor. And, it is educative experiences that lead to this realization and cultivation of morality.

Dewey is drawing our attention to understand that traditional education fails because schools create experiences for the learner that are uninteresting and disengaging. They provide experiences in isolation and disconnected from the learner's life. The challenge for progressive education is to provide educative experiences; namely those that grow out of the learner's thoughts, desires, purpose, and will. To do this, the teacher must be active in the classroom and be connected to the learner as a being. He must know what experiences will further the learner's knowledge of the world: "He must be aware of the potentialities for leading students into new fields which belong to experiences already had, and must use this knowledge as his criterion for selection and arrangement of the conditions that influence their present experience." (Dewey 1938/1997, 76). And, as Dewey contends, "it is the business of the educator to see in what direction an experience is heading" (Dewey 1938/1997, 38). Indeed, it is the responsibility of the educator to provide experiences that excite the learner's overall being, spring from his impulses, and make him see his life as meaningful and important in relation to himself and others. As Rousseau so appropriately captures in his work *Emile*, "Prior to the calling of his [the child's] parents is nature's call to human life. Living is the job I want to teach him" (1762/1979, 41). Dewey would agree that lived experiences are what aid in the learner's whole development. For, as Dewey states, "All education which develops power to share effectively in social life is moral" (1916/2005, 209). The learner develops his self-self relation by engaging in educative experiences that connect him to his own humanness, which in-turn develop pity and compassion as he relates with the same humanness in others. In the next chapter, I discuss how the ideas

from Rousseau, Herbart and Dewey recommend a new definition of teacher and learner as persons.

Part II What Makes an Educational Teacher-Learner Relationship

Chapter 3: The Relational Aspects of the Educational Context: Hansen and Noddings on Teacher and Learner as Persons

Whatever the moralists may say about it, human understanding owes much to the Passions, which by common agreement also owe much to it. It is by their activity that our reason is perfected; we seek to know only because we desire to have pleasure; and it is impossible to conceive why one who had neither desires nor fears would go to the trouble of reasoning³¹.

-Rousseau

Marianne Williamson quotes, “You must learn a new way to *think* before you can master a new way to *be*”³². This quote captures my purpose for revisiting the traditional views of the teacher and learner and generating a philosophical shift in how both are perceived in the educational context. As Dewey’s description of traditional education depicts, the teacher and the learner have an institutional relationship where the teacher is defined as being an authority figure who delivers curriculum guides and manages conduct and the learner as an empty vessel waiting to be filled up with knowledge³³. In this case, all educational initiatives, whether academic, social, or moral, as well as learning activities that complement the curriculum, are designed within this traditional perception. Williamson’s quote is emphasizing that if we want to make a shift in the way that we relate with others and *are* in the world, then we need to change the way we think about ourselves and others first. In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate that we need to visit our traditional assumptions about teachers and learners and develop a new conception of both. In this way, this new conception will allow teachers and learners to *be* a different way, a more progressive way in the classroom (Dewey 1938, 17-23). This means that, within our culture, we have to let go of our assumptions about who the teacher and the learner are, and

³¹ See Rousseau (1755/1992, 26).

³² See Marianne Williamson (2012).

³³ Dewey *Experience and Education* (1938, 17-23).

construct new notions of identity for both. As I will discuss in this chapter, David Hansen and Nel Noddings offer such notions. By examining Hansen's notion of the teacher and learner as persons, I aim to demonstrate that the space for moral education becomes natural. Both members are given the space to connect to their human selves within the educational context. By examining Nodding's notions of the cared-for and the one-caring, I aim to demonstrate how the reciprocity in the teacher-learner relationship, within a space of freedom and experience, contribute to the moral development of the learner.

3.1 A Philosophical Shift in the Conception of the Learner: From Pupil to Person

David Hansen's work *The Moral Heart of Teaching* (2001) explores the idea of *learner as person*, which is a significant shift from a traditional understanding of the learner as empty vessel. Arguably, it is also a significant shift in the more contemporary models of education where the learner is perceived as an academic mind in which to be cultivated, or archetypical student detached from desires and individual will. Although present models of education have started to embrace constructivist and developmental learning, and accepted a pedagogy that dismisses the learner as empty vessel, the moral aspect of learning has continued to be forgotten. In order to address this aspect, I have argued that learners be given learning opportunities which allow them to explore and experiment outside of the mandated curriculum. This requires, as I will discuss in this chapter, that the educational system perceive both the learner and the teacher as *persons*.

In *Experience and Education* (1938), Dewey describes the context of a traditional educational pedagogy. Within this description, we find the learner being defined by her learning environment and expectations. The learner in a traditional schoolhouse was expected to sit in her

seat and absorb the delivery of the curriculum from the teacher. She was expected to be still and silent, and recite and memorize the material being presented. Stories and poems were chosen to demonstrate who and what was good and material was also selected to show the demise of those who were not good. Stepping out of line, so to speak, meant talking with others, giggling, and socializing. The learner was expected to suppress her social impulses and only be present to what the teacher wanted. Anything other than attending to her work could warrant a punishment that ranged from physical abuse to humiliation. Education was based in fear of authority and the classroom ethos was one of 'learn or we will hurt you'. School was a place to be right and not to be wrong, and that meant that the learner's main task was to memorize what was already known about the world and not to discover anything new. Dewey describes this context:

The subject matter of education consists of bodies of information and of skills that have been worked out in the past; therefore, the chief business of the school is to transmit them to the new generation. In the past, there have also been developed standards and rules of conduct; moral training consists in forming habits of action in conformity with these rules and standards. Finally, the general pattern of school organization (by which I mean the relations of pupils to one another and to the teacher) constitutes the school a kind of institution sharply marked off from other social institutions. Call up in imagination the ordinary school-room, its time-schedules, schemes of classification, of examination and promotion, rules of order, and I think you will grasp what is meant by 'pattern of organization'. (1938/1997, 17-18)

Dewey is presenting this discourse to call for a new education. He argues for an education that involves redefining the educational context to include the experience of the learner. In this way, he is also calling for a redefinition of the learner. Should the learner be expected to be still and silent? Should the learner be expected to memorize and recite? And, should the learner be expected to suppress her will, desires, and social impulses?

The answer to these questions changes based on how we view the learner. I argue that the learner ought to be viewed and honoured as a *person*. To be a *person*, as described by Hansen,

one must be formed and shaped by the influence of others. Hansen identifies three aspects of being a person: 1) having agency, intentions, will, and thought 2) having feelings, imagination, and memory 3) having the need for socialization. Without these aspects, a being would only live to serve his basic survival needs. This connects to Rousseau's distinction between civilized man and animals in *A Discourse of the Origin of Inequality* (1755). Therein, Rousseau describes that the faculties that make man a person and distinguish him from other animals is his ability to will in a direction that does not merely serve himself, but serves the good of others. What makes a being a person is this freedom to will and perfectibility (see Chapter 1 on Rousseau).

In much of traditional schooling the learner is not perceived of as a person³⁴. The environment of the traditional school does not embrace the learner as a social being having a will, desires, and impulses, and it does not respect freedom. Indeed, the learner in the traditional classroom is understood through a reductionist paradigm—a belief that the learner is a sum of academic parts that can be separated from his being and then perfected. For instance, it was the belief that if the teacher separated and then honed in on the mathematics, language, science, social, and artistic parts of the learner individually then each part of the learner would become well educated after completion of all the grade levels within the education system. In theory, it isn't until after all these parts of the learner are developed that he becomes 'educated'. We have learned from Rousseau, Herbart, and Dewey that this is not the aim of education. Therefore, there needs to be a new definition and image of the learner, a general delineation within the system of education as well as a personal perception held by the teacher, that does not reduce the learner to a sum of his parts, but rather recognizes, appreciates, and understands him as a *person*.

³⁴ See Dewey *Experience and Education* (1938/1997, 17-23).

David Hansen provides a comprehensive notion of a person that is significant for education. As Hansen underscores a person has agency, intentions, will, and thought:

In taking for granted the notion of a person, as we typically do, we take for granted human qualities that would strike us as wondrous if they were not so commonplace. For example, when we encounter one another in offices, homes, restaurants, schools, on the street, we treat each other as having agency. That is, we presume that we have both the capacity and the disposition to engage in certain actions – as simple as avoiding barging into one another and as complex as initiating a conversation. In assuming that other people can act as agents rather than robots, we also regard them as having the related qualities of intentionality and will. We presume that others have intentions, in the everyday sense of the word, just as we ourselves do; to read a book, go to the store, have coffee with a friend, take a nap, and so forth. We take for granted that others have a will. They not only form intentions, but they realize them in action. They can and will read the book, go to the store, and show up for the rendezvous. (2001, 22)

How do we move to a model of education that embraces the learner as person? The challenge of re-defining the learner, which I argue is the foundation of any educational model, lays in confronting teachers with the task of reflecting upon their perspectives of learners and providing them with opportunities to relate to the learner as a person. Not only do teachers need to assume that the learner has a will, but also that he or she has feelings, imagination, and memory:

We presume that persons feel things. We try to avoid saying or doing things that hurt them. We also assume that people imagine possibilities in their lives. They have dreams, hopes, and aspirations, however muted these may be, just as we ourselves do. We presuppose that persons have memories and can retain knowledge, thereby freeing us from a nightmare world in which we would have to explain everything to everyone every time we saw them. (Hansen 2001, 39)

Addressing the learner as one with feelings, imagination, and memory is not achieved by giving him or her academic exercises of regurgitation; learners must also be provided with experiences,

as I pointed out in the previous chapter with Dewey. Through academic exercises the teacher learns the cognitive abilities of the learner, that is, what he knows or does not know. Through experiences the teacher learns *who* the learner is in terms of his personality, character, emotions, beliefs, desires, impulses, and will. It is within this context the teacher learns what makes the learner feel happy, sad, frustrated, excited, interested, and the like. And, it is here, that the teacher can see the learner choose the good. As Hansen describes above, this idea of education is only possible when the teacher views the learner as a person.

By offering learners the chance to experience the world and not just memorize information, they come to understand that they construct knowledge based on interaction. On this view, an educational learning environment requires a social component. Hansen highlights this important need for human beings: “Finally, we regard a person as a social being, as having grown up, like ourselves, in a social world in which we take on language, customs, beliefs, and more. We take for granted the fact that persons live in a world populated with other persons” (2001, 22). It follows that for a school context to be educational it needs to provide learners with opportunities to socialize and interact with others. If the teacher accepts that the learner is a person, and thus a social being, then most of the curriculum ought to be facilitated in a social way. Teachers will no longer see the traditional notion of the passive, silenced learner as valid; instead they will begin to accept the learner as active and freely engaging in experiences that include talking, asking questions, and discussing new ideas. It is important to note that I am not suggesting that the classroom be a place without limitations. As I discussed earlier in the Rousseau and Dewey sections, freedom entails some limitation if it is seen to lead the learner to further educative experiences. Conversely, I am suggesting that everything from the placement of the furniture in the classroom to the rules of conduct in the classroom allow for learners to

have a voice, experiment, reflect, socialize, and engage in discussion. This means teaching about listening to others, talking with others, and how to have control of one's will and respect for oneself and others. The difference lays in the means by which these are achieved. They are not achieved through forced silence and punishment, but rather through experiences of engagement and reflection.

Hansen says of the teacher, "...a person is a social being raised in a social world characterized by language, custom, belief, and much more...In saying that the teacher thinks or feels *something*, rather than doing so in a vacuum, I am suggesting that the teacher thinks and feels within a social medium" (2001, 27). This is also true of the learner. For no child has ever been raised in a vacuum. From the very first moments of life, he or she has interacted with another human being. Everything he learns, his nature and his being, has come about through an interaction. A moral education model embraces this knowledge, and it understands that the learner needs to interact *and* also needs to be alone. Persons do need time for interaction because it provides lived-experiences and an opportunity to understand each other as human beings, but they also need time for being alone because it provides the silence for thought and the opportunity to connect with one's own humanness. Indeed, Hansen is asking us to consider these elements that we take for granted and make them a pivotal awareness in our consciousness. Anyone, but especially the caregiver and educator, must be aware of these assumptions and realize them in their practice if they are to reconstruct their image of a the learner as person.

The way we define the learner is central to how we develop any concept of what education is , as well as how we "practice" educating. For instance, if we believe the learner is a person, then what we do will significantly reflect that belief. Therefore, to reform what remains of the traditional model of education in our schools, we must call on philosophy to get those in

the business of educating to reflect and change their beliefs about what education is, what teaching is, and what learning is, and this starts with identifying both learner and teacher (as I discuss next) as persons.

3.2 A Philosophical Shift in the Conception of the Teacher: From Deliverer of Curriculum Guides and Enforcer of Conduct to Person

From the point of view of the individual teacher, there are few things more striking, and yet so familiar, than the fact that he or she is a person, not a thing, a functionary, or a mere instrument of others' ends³⁵. – David Hansen

Drawing on Hansen, I examine the notion of the teacher as person and how this is expressed within the teacher's conduct. He or she must not be perceived as a deliverer of curriculum guides and enforcer of conduct. Much like we saw with the learner, the teacher must be perceived as having agency, intentions, will, and thought. He or she must be understood as having feelings, imagination, and memory, as well as a need for socialization. I argue that although the teacher must be perceived by others as a person, he or she must also perceive him or herself as a person. For, it is this self-connection that affords moral sensibility and thus the capacity to make choices regarding the moral nurturing of others that reflect this sensibility.

Within the traditional model of education, the teacher is perceived as a being that performs the duties of delivering curriculum and administering discipline. She has been streamlined in her practice, and even today there is popular view that the teacher is a functionary of the education system, one that can be ordered to conform to the prescribed method of teaching and

³⁵ See Hansen (2001,40).

adopt the mandated content of teaching. Dewey describes this traditional perception of the teacher in *Experience and Education* (1938):

The main purpose or objective [of education] is to prepare the young for future responsibilities and for success in life, by means of acquisition of the organized bodies of information and prepared forms of skill which comprehend the material of instruction. Since the subject-matter as well as standards of proper conduct are handed down from the past, the attitude of the pupils must, upon the whole, be one of docility, receptivity, and obedience. Books, especially textbooks, are the chief representatives of the lore and wisdom of the past, while teachers are the organs through which pupils are brought into effective connection with the material. Teachers are the agents through which knowledge and skills are communicated and rules of conduct enforced. (18)

As described by Dewey, the traditional educational context was rigid and predetermined. Both the learner and the teacher were bound by expectations of conformity and determined notions of acceptable conduct. Within this traditional model, the teacher was discouraged from allowing students to view her as a person. There was an assumption that this would diminish her ‘authority’ and ‘power’; her vulnerabilities and feelings would be exposed and she would lose her solid and rigid presence.

If we define the teacher as a person, then the teacher’s task changes and what we define as learning also shifts. We begin to see learning as a relational process, something constructed and comprised of the relationship between teacher and learner. Learning becomes more than the acquisition of knowledge; it becomes a way of being and experiencing. Learning, on this model of education, is not a final product that is achieved. Rather, it includes a way of being in the world. It includes cognition, but it also includes emotion, reflection, and relation. The way to achieve this is to first shift the traditional perception of the teacher from “the agents through which knowledge and skills are communicated and rules of conduct enforced” (Dewey 1938, 18) to that of a person.

In the traditional vision of education, the freedom of the teacher, along with his or her will and imagination, went unrecognized as strengths in his or her practice when providing an educational space for learners. On a progressive model, these elements are encouraged as they help embrace and construct a learning space for moral education. The teacher as person means that the teacher is a being with desires, intentions, impulses, and a will. As Hansen describes,

The teacher has a sense of agency, can fashion intentions, can act on them, can think about what he or she does (for example, caring and positive regard for students), can use imagination, and can remember things pertinent to the work. We also presume that the teacher, as a person, is a social being, a being who recognizes and can partake in the sorts of everyday interactions between people that occur in schools and classrooms. (2001, 24)

Perceiving the teacher as a person has significant consequences for understanding the teacher's role in the learning environment. The teacher facilitates experiences that promote cognitive and moral learning.

Viewing the teacher as a person also changes how we view a teacher's conduct. Teachers attain more responsibility to make decisions about learning and not act robotically or habitually. Hansen draws attention to the notion of conduct. Conduct in teaching "comprises the characteristic doings of a person. In other words, it reveals and expresses his or her character" (2001, 29). And, as Hansen infers, conduct is the lens to the person. This component of *who* is the teacher is important to a model of moral education because it reminds teachers that what they do and how they are is suggestive of their person. Conduct, as suggested by Hansen, has intention and aims. It is not the same as reacting to an environmental stimuli, or mere behavior, but rather is found in the decisions one makes. For example, if a teacher yells at a learner, this may be a response to a frustrating conflict, but the decision to apologize and restore the relationship is reflective of that teacher's conduct. The intention and aim of the teacher's

conduct, when he or she realizes him or herself as a person, becomes evident; that is, he or she acts in a way that aims to value the learner because he or she recognizes him as a person too. The teacher acts in light of his or her connection as a person to the learner's being as a person.

On this notion of the teacher, teaching happens indirectly through the environment, as Dewey highlights: "...the only way in which adults consciously control the kind of education which the immature get is by controlling the environment in which they act, and hence think and feel. We never educate directly, but indirectly by means of environment" (Dewey 1909/2005, 14). Teachers' choices about how to act and shape the learning environment influence the education of each learner. Therefore, as Hansen emphasizes, the conduct of the teacher is an aspect of the learning environment. Moreover, it is the teacher's conduct that also indirectly influences the education and person of the learner. This influence is not had in the same way by attempts to transmit information directly to learners as is done on the traditional model of education. Such methods may work to get learners to mindlessly regurgitate information, but they do not promote the education of learners as persons who can think, feel, imagine, and make self-critical decisions.

By having the freedom to be a teacher as person, the moral aspects of the learner are also influenced and structured. As seen in the theories of Rousseau and Herbart, it is the way teachers are with their pupils that either foster a warmth for the good or not. For example, a genuine apology from a teacher can change and shape the moral sensibility of the learner. The change does not happen because the teacher apologizes because he must, it happens because the teacher apologizes because this is a reflection of his character. He believes the learner is a person and someone worthy of dignity and respect. When he apologizes, the learner doesn't

simply ‘see’ the apology. On the contrary, the learner sees that he or she is a person and someone worthy of dignity and respect through the conduct of the teacher.

The moral sensibility of the teacher is a composition of the teacher’s person and conduct. It is what Rousseau describes as the *amour de soi-même* and what Herbart alludes to as the *inner censor*. According to Hansen, “A moral sensibility embodies a person’s disposition toward life and the people and events he or she encounters. It describes how a person fuses humaneness and thought in a way he or she regards and treats others” (Hansen 2001, 32). To embody a moral disposition towards other people means to have a specific set of beliefs about others. As I have argued, this would mean that the teacher is a person who’s core belief about learners is that they are persons too. Having a moral sensibility requires one to view others, and oneself, as persons and not simply as means to an end. Moral sensibility includes the way in which we act towards others as opposed to just the action itself. Hansen underscores this distinction in the following example:

...two teachers might provide the same instructions for a small-group activity or identical explanations of a method for interpreting poetry. However, one teacher might be brusque and impatient, conveying the message that he does not trust or like his students. Or he might perform in a blasé or casual manner, signalling that he does not care about the outcome of the activity. Another teacher, offering the same remarks, might do so in an enthusiastic and supportive spirit, thereby expressing her involvement in teaching and her confidence in her students’ power to learn. It’s not hard to imagine which classroom students might prefer. Their choice would reflect the fact that teachers differ not so much in their technical knowledge or expertise as in their moral sensibility. (2001, 33)

We learn from this example that the teacher who’s connection to her person is revealed through her conduct influences the learner more positively than the teacher who remains suppressed and rigid. Furthermore, when the teacher is not bound by fear or bureaucracy, and allows herself to

be a person and associate her teacher identity with being a person, her moral sensibility will naturally create a learning space to receive the learners as persons. When these components are established in the educational context, the moral development and education of both the teacher and the learner thrive.

If we re-examine the present day state of education, it becomes apparent that changes need to be made to realize the full potential of a system that starts from the view that both teacher and learner are persons. Although it may be possible to achieve this in a grassroots way, starting with the teacher who takes on the task his or herself, it is more likely that a larger scale shift is needed within the whole system of education to begin to define the teacher and learner as persons. Before teachers are selected into the profession, there needs to be opportunities for individuals to consider the philosophical notion of considering themselves as persons. Only when this is achieved, is the potential set up for a model of education that embraces morality. And, only when this philosophical undertaking is considered, is a teacher ready to be immersed into an evolving system of education where his or her creativity and imagination will be constantly challenged as to make decisions in a way reflective of being a person.

3.3 The Teacher-Learner Relationship: The Cared-For and the One-Caring

How good I can be is partly a function of how you -the other- receive and respond to me. Whatever virtue I exercise is completed, fulfilled, in you. The primary aim of all education must be nurturance of the ethical idea³⁶. -Noddings

What is caring and why is it an important aspect in moral education? Nel Noddings's *Caring* (1984/2003) offers an approach to further understanding the teacher and learner as

³⁶ See Noddings (1984/2003, 6).

persons, and moreover to reconceptualizing the teacher-learner relationship. Noddings defines the teacher as the *one-caring* and the learner as the *cared-for*. Furthermore, in defining the one-caring, Noddings discusses the teacher's role within the development of the concepts caring and receiving³⁷. Caring is highlighted through the conveyance in the attitude of the one-caring towards the cared-for, as well as in how the teacher sets up the educational context to secure the appropriate independence and intrinsic ownership within the learner. Receiving is explained through the act of the one-caring being 'totally with the other' (Noddings 1984/2003, 32). The teacher feels with the learner, not for him or her. It is this type of engrossment that comprises caring and connects to the work of David Hansen; that is, caring is the act of conveying to another through a relationship that he or she is a *person*.

As I will demonstrate here, caring or "feeling with the other" is not a scripted exercise, and does not involve a mere exchange of actions and emotions through dialogue. Rather, it involves expression, tone, body language, essence, compassion and feeling. Caring, as captured by Noddings, is realizing the other's experience in one's self through experiencing the other as human: "I feel what he says he felt. I have been invaded by this other. Quite simply, I shall never again be completely without regard for him. My professional opinion has not changed, but I am now prepared to care where previously I was not" (1984/2003, 31). When we experience the other as human, we are also realizing him as a person. This realization is critical for both the teacher and learner to see each other in this way. And, to get a place of *seeing* one must be prepared to care and also to feel. For many teachers, this is a radical idea to bring to their

³⁷ For more on specific connections and contrasts between Noddings' feminist ethics and phenomenological perspectives see Morrison, Harriet B. "Caring Teacher-Pupil Relationship: Feminist or Phenomenological?" (1985). While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to address Noddings' feminism, I hope to have made clear that I am taking a critical humanist approach in that the concepts I develop in part one and two are meant to have meaning for all human beings, male or female, while at the same time accounting for the uniqueness of every individual.

practice. As seen in the traditional education classroom, feelings were void, and teachers were expected to conduct themselves with an icy presence that intimidated learners and coerced them to learn. The point of Noddings work is fundamental: we must embrace a model of education that goes past human cognitive abilities and begins with an interest and reception for human feelings. In this section, I examine the relationship between the teacher and learner as a relationship between the *one-caring* and the *cared-for*.

Within the educational context, the teacher is, what Noddings calls, the *one-caring*. For Noddings, the chief role of the *one-caring* is to receive the *cared-for*. Noddings illustrates this movement more explicitly in the following:

The notion of “feeling with” that I have outlined does not involve projection but reception. I have called it “engrossment”. I do not “put myself in others shoes,” so to speak, by analyzing his reality as objective data and then asking, “How would I feel in such a situation?” On the contrary, I set aside my temptation to analyze and to plan. I do not project; I receive the other into myself, and I see and feel with the other. I become a duality. (1984/2003, 30)

I draw attention to the point of ‘I do not put myself in others shoes’. In many character education lessons where teachers intend to foster the moral development of the learner, they engage learners in exercises of empathy by imagining what it would be like to be in the other person’s shoes. Noddings is asking teachers not to do this. On the contrary, she is asking teachers to be present in a situation with another person and feel with him or her, not for him or her. This, for Noddings, is the important distinction between receiving the learner and thinking about him or her. The one-caring begins to be different with others and starts to live through feeling and cognition, rather than simply through maxims and objective problem-solving processes. When this type of caring happens in the educational context, the teacher begins to

learn that the learner will not, and more importantly does not, make the same decisions that she would.

To care means to honor the cared-for's path and show him how to guide him or herself along the way. Only when teachers can accept that their paths are not the same paths as the learners' can they engage in the caring that Noddings describes. Otherwise, as seen in the traditional education context, teachers get caught up in trying to make students do this or that, learn this or that, and be this or that, because that is what has been pre-decided. This is what Noddings means when she says the one-caring and the cared-for become a 'duality' (1984/2003, 30). They are one in terms of caring and feeling, but remain two individual parts on two different paths with two individual wills. This reception of the learner keeps the teacher from falling into the purely objective and rational. It keeps him or her grounded in seeing the cared-for as a person. In receiving, the one-caring is allowing herself to be transformed. Moreover, she is allowing herself to be affected by another person because she is allowing herself to feel with him. To help illustrate this, Noddings presents an example of where caring and receiving are not present. For instance, if the teacher does not attend to the learner's feelings, but rather to the problem at hand, and uses her rational abilities rather than her moral sensibility, then she is not receiving nor caring in the way that Noddings describes. By simply analyzing a problem, teachers do not allow themselves to be transformed by the interaction with the learner. It is not that teachers should not try to examine the problematic elements of a learner's situation, but they must always do this with the individual learner in mind. Noddings describes this interaction between caring and rationalizing through the learner's situation:

And we, in caring, respond; we express ourselves, we make plans, we execute. But there, are, properly, turning points. As we convert what we have received from the other into a problem, something to be solved, we move away from the other. We clean up his reality,

strip it of complex and bothersome qualities, in order to think it. The other's reality becomes data, stuff to be analyzed, studied, interpreted. All this is to be expected and entirely appropriate, provided that we see the essential turning points and move back to the concrete and the personal. Thus we keep our objective thinking tied to a relational stake at the heart of caring. When we fail to do this, we can climb into clouds of abstraction, moving rapidly away from the caring situation into a domain of objective and impersonal problems where we are free to impose structures as we will. If I do not turn away from my abstractions, I lose the one cared-for. Indeed, I lose myself as one-caring, for I now care about a problem instead of a person. (1984/2003, 36)

It's important for teachers to pause and reflect on what Noddings is suggesting. What would caring for the learner look like over caring for his problems? For me, this distinction is one of the forgotten moral aspects in education; that of receiving the other. Classrooms need to become places where each learner is perceived as a person. The teacher must shift his or her view of the learner as a pupil to the learner as a person and recognize that the learner is a partner within the educational context.

The other being in the teacher-learner relationship is the learner, or who Noddings calls, the *cared-for*. For Noddings, the cared-for is one that is defined by the one-caring. For, it is the one-caring that sets the cared-for up to be at his or her best, and it is the one-caring to which the cared-for respond: "The cared-for responds to the presence of the one-caring. He feels the difference between being received and being held off or ignored. Whatever the one-caring actually does is enhanced or diminished, made meaningful or meaningless, in the attitude conveyed to the cared-for" (Noddings 1984/2003, 60-61). This notion of attitude, presented by Noddings, is powerful in that it puts the teacher in a place to use his or her relationship with the learner in such a way as to influence his moral development. As we saw with Rousseau, through the education of Emile, the teacher must be one who is always working with the learner, attending to his will in a way that fosters moral development by cultivating self-love based in

preservation, pity, and compassion. In much the same way, Noddings is saying that the cared-for is a being that wants this type of attention; he wants somebody to love and help guide him. It is in this context that caring emerges.

Noddings highlights how caring emerges through the environment. She claims:

We do not usually, as caring parents, select activities to share with our children on the basis of some 'learning plan'; we do not, for example, take our children to the zoo so that they will be able to name and describe ten animals native to Africa. Rather, we decide more or less spontaneously to spend an afternoon at the zoo, because we remember our own childish pleasure in such occasions and anticipate delight in sharing the experience with our children. That our children learn things through visits to the zoo, museums, national monuments, and the like is something we all take for granted but, for most of us, the potential learning is not what motivates the visits. We often find ourselves in teaching-learning situations with our children, but these arise naturally in the companionable relationship established through caring. We commit ourselves to our children. (1984/2003, 61-62)

Noddings' example emphasizes that caring is cultivated through particular situations and experiences we share with young people. From these situations, we want children to develop respect for themselves by knowing they are special and that they are important enough to be taken to a special place. We demonstrate to our children that we want them to develop respect for us in receiving the gift of the experience we are offering, and we want them to develop respect for others through the expectations of how to conduct oneself socially so that others are considered. All of this comes about through the experiences we offer our children. But, within all this, we also want to strengthen the bond in the relationship we have with our children.

Noddings makes clear that a certain kind of "commitment" to the learner is necessary. When one conveys commitment to the cared-for through something as simple as sharing an experience, then the self-love that Rousseau speaks of and the inner freedom mediated by inner censor that Herbart describes, is realized. It is caring, in the way that Noddings describes, that

influences the moral development of the learner. This commitment in caring relates to Noddings' statement that "the one-caring sees the best self in the cared-for and works with him to actualize that self" (1984/2003, 64). To see the best in another, one must present an attitude towards the cared-for that conveys value. That is, the teacher must act in such a way that the learner feels valued, physically, emotionally, socially, and morally. While it is through caring that the teacher conveys to the learner that he or she is a person, a being of freedom and individual will, and worthy of dignity and respect, it is also necessary that the learner sees him or herself as being cared-for and acknowledges what the teacher does as actually caring.

The teacher must convey an attitude of caring in the way he or she teaches, speaks, chooses words, uses tone, and makes decisions. All of these impact the way learners feel about themselves and whether they determine the teacher's actions and attitudes are in fact caring. Typically in schools, students are talked at, and they recognize, despite a teacher's intentions, that this is not caring. Noddings explains, "To be talked at by people for whom we do not exist...throws us back upon ourselves. To be treated as 'types' instead of individuals, to have strategies exercised on us, objectifies us. We become 'cases' instead of persons" (1984/2003, 66). It is very easy for teachers to convey this attitude towards a learner in the classroom. For example, the teacher in a classroom who delivers a curriculum to students through a method of being 'talked at' by standing in the front of a classroom is someone who objectifies students. At the same time, the educational system that demands specific strategies be put in place to manage a learner's behaviour and conduct, treats the learner as a case instead of a person.

The transformation to caring, that of receiving the cared-for, must begin with both the teacher and the educational system with which he or she represents. It will require teachers experiencing themselves as the cared-for, either by the education system or the administrators, to

undergo this transformation that allows them to see the learners as persons. And it will require that teachers take a chance, pause, and not react immediately to a learner's problem. Instead, the teacher should take a risk in receiving the learner, and feeling with him or her. Whatever the case, the teacher as the one-caring, ought be a person who's perception is grounded in viewing others as persons. Then, caring for the cared-for comes naturally and authentically. The model of education presented in this thesis, one that aims to cultivate the moral development of the learner and aligns with the educational theories of Rousseau, Herbart, Dewey, Hansen, and Noddings, thus far, challenges the traditional delivery model of teaching and any argument that it serves to develop the moral compass of a learner. In this chapter, I have also sought to point out that there is a connection between how a person develops emotionally and how he or she develops morally. To perceive others as persons in a moral sense, that is, as having dignity and deserving of unconditional respect, one must have developed the capacities of self-love (*amour de soi-même*), compassion and pity. With respect to the teacher as the one-caring, these capacities allow for the one-caring to nurture the emotional realm of the learner, ensuring her that she is safe and cared-for. Once the learner is provided with a trusted space to develop emotionally, the learner will take risks because she knows that she is received by the one caring; that is, she knows that if she falls, the one-caring will be there with her. Indeed, to be treated as a person, through a conveyance of an attitude of caring, is what allows the learner to be at his best, develop self-love, connect with his humanness, and realize the humanness in others. These notions of personhood and caring in the teacher-learner relationship change how we view the teacher's authority, an idea I turn to next.

Chapter 4: A New Definition of Teacher Authority

If the teacher agrees to submerge himself into the system, if he consents to being defined by others' views of what he is supposed to be, he gives up his freedom 'to see, to understand, and to signify' for himself. If he is immersed and impermeable, he can hardly stir others to define themselves as individuals³⁸. - Maxine Greene

Traditionally, the notion of power has been directly associated with definitions of teacher authority. Within these definitions power is perceived as positional, and because the teacher was considered as 'all-knowing' the learners were expected to conform to expectations and learn what they were taught. Contrasting this, in the model of education that I am proposing, power is constantly negotiated between the teacher and the learner. Power exists in every classroom and it is important for both teachers and learners to know that it is something to be shared and used for moral gain within the educative space. It is a notion of great importance because it has such a high impact on the moral identity of the learner.

In the first section of this chapter, I discuss Wilmot & Hocher's (2001) notion of power. Their research helps us understand power in three ways; *designative*, *distributive*, and *integrative*. I use these definitions to suggest ways in which power ought to be redefined and used to support a model of education that embraces the moral development of the learner. I also draw upon Nicholas Burbules, who explains this idea pragmatically by describing the teacher's authority as relational. The authority of the teacher is not a status, a use of position, or a state of privilege. In contrast, the authority of the teacher is only defined by his or her relationship with the learner. Without the learner, the teacher would have no authority. To illustrate this use of power, I use a metaphor of the teacher as the riverbank (Nash, 1966) to show the appropriate use of restriction. That is, if the banks of the river are unstructured and loose, then the river will flow

³⁸ See Greene (1973, 270).

everywhere, and if the banks of the river are too sturdy and structured, then the river is constricted and cannot flow freely. I draw out this metaphor in order to explain how Nash's concept of the teacher's authority supports Rousseau's theory of *amour de soi-même* and the development of self-love with guidance. In addition, I explore the work of Maxine Greene to argue how a relational learning context supports the work of Noddings in that it is a place of "*persons among persons*" (Greene 1986, 440).

In the second section of the chapter, I examine how authority and freedom interrelate and how the definition and expression of respect factor into it. Indeed, there needs to be structure and restrictions to guide the learner's moral development and ensure further educative experiences. Within all this, however, the freedom of intelligence of the learner, as Dewey called it, that is, his thoughts, desires, and purposes, need to be valued and realized within the educational context. This freedom is established through respect; a mutual valuing of persons among persons (Greene, 1986). To conclude the chapter, I explore the traditional understanding of respect and suggest how it can be redefined in accordance to support a new definition of authority. Using the work of Joan F. Goodman, I describe how the notion of respect is interpreted by both the teacher and the learner, traditionally and progressively. Her research discusses the dynamics of respect within the teacher-learner relationship and explores its role in negotiating power. Respect is a key idea in progressive education and it serves as the foundation in which most behavior plans and codes of conduct are based. On the new model, respect is defined as valuing. It has rational roots, but it also requires experience. In other words, the first measure in acquiring respect is to know what it means and the second measure is to experience it. As I will discuss below, this experience must be discovered within the teacher-learner

relationship in order for that relationship to be educational. Respect provides the thread in the relationships that foster moral development and cultivate humanity within the classroom.

4.1 What is Power and Authority? Re-Defining the Educational Teacher-Learner Relationship

Within the teacher-learner relationship, power has usually been on the side of the teacher and used over the learner. It is an important force that exists within this relationship and I aim to demonstrate that it is one that ought to be shared and negotiated by teacher and learner. Moreover, *how* the power is used by both members determines the nature of their relationship, which in-turn has influence on the moral development of the learner. William Wilmot & Joyce Hocher (2001) describe power as either seen as “ (1) *designated* (power given by your position), (2) *distributive* (either/or power), or (3) *integrative* (both/and power)” (95). They explain, “*Designated* power comes from your position, as being a manager, the mother or father of a family, or the leader of a team. Your power is conferred by the position you hold. *Distributive* power focuses on power over or against the party [I dominate you or you dominate me³⁹]...*Integrative* power highlights power *with* the other...Integrative definitions focus on ‘both/and’ --both parties have to achieve something in the relationship” (Wilmot & Hocher 2001, 95). It is within the traditional model of education, from which the current model of education has evolved, where the definition of the authority of the teacher was immersed in his or her use of power. To be sure, the use of power was perceived as *designated* in that the teacher was in a position to hold control over the learner. Within this educational context, the teacher was a figure expected to enforce rules and management to ensure the implementation of the mandated curriculum. This meant that the thoughts, desires, and purposes of the individual

³⁹ See Burgoon, Johnson, and Koch (1998) as cited in Wilmot & Hocher (2001, 95).

learner could be compromised and dismissed in order to meet these expectations. The teacher could demand blind obedience and implement punishment in order to produce conformity and control.

If truth be told, within any classroom, the teacher is the higher-powered individual. This is achieved because the teacher has control over the resources and learning currencies (assigning grades, selecting texts, choosing learning activities, making groups, etc.) that the learner needs to complete his education and demonstrate social success. For it is the teacher that possesses the power currencies such as resource control, interpersonal linkages, communication skills, and expertise⁴⁰. And, as we saw with Wilmot & Hoher (2001), it is how the teacher perceives his or her power that defines his or her authority. Learners have a sharp awareness of these currencies and they express behaviors depending on how these currencies are portrayed by the teacher. If a teacher presents his or her authority from a place of *designated* and *distributive* power, and the learner feels overpowered and controlled, he or she will become disruptive and rebellious. He or she will behave in a way as to *make* their thoughts, desires, and purposes valued and accepted by the teacher, and the learner will aim to dominate, as to not be dominated. As we saw with Rousseau, the learner will function from a place of anger and his ego will be what guides his social and moral decisions. Thus, the cultivation of his moral self will be corrupt and he will function from a place of *amour-propre*. The teacher who uses power in this sense, one that holds all the cards in the educational context, so to speak, devalues the learner as person. Indeed, Rousseau, Herbart, and Dewey would all agree that the traditional educational context is incompatible with providing a space for moral education because it rejects the freedom of the will of the learner. Indeed, those learners that knew how to do what the teacher wanted and

⁴⁰ See Wilmot & Hoher (2001, 06-109).

conformed were ‘*successful*’, and those that challenged the teacher’s intentions and desires, exercised their own thoughts, desires, and purposes were labelled as unruly and punished. On a model of education that supports moral education, it is important that the teacher know his or her authority is not found in controlling the learner, but rather in controlling the learning environment. Put another way, the teacher’s authority is that he or she has direct control over the learning environment and thus only indirect control over learning.

As seen in Wilmot & Hoher (2001), power is defined when one person has something that the other person wants. The teacher that accepts his or her authority as having power over others is an enforcer, one who uses their power to uphold the rules and maintain the social order of the classroom through coercion (physical force) and/or manipulation (psychological persuasion). These teachers are “apt to fall into the temptation of viewing persons as means rather than ends and of using their authority to subordinate or destroy the will of others” (Nash 1966, 104). What we have learned from this traditional educational paradigm is that it is not effective in cultivating the morality of the learner. Conversely, it has imprisoned the freedom of others and crushed their desires, creativity, and personality. The learners of this time have been conditioned to perform solely within the matrix of their environment and have strung through a system that has failed to prepare them for problem-solving, personal development, and self-discipline. To begin the transition into a better model of education, the power within the teacher-learner relationship needs to be viewed as *integrative*, relational, and negotiated. On this model, the teacher uses power to shape the learning experiences in the classroom, based on the thoughts, desires, and purposes of the learners. At the same time, the learner uses power to assert and develop his thoughts, desires, and purposes. Wilmot & Hoher explain, "Power is not owned by an individual but is a product of the social relationship in which certain qualities become

important and valuable to others...In a mutually beneficial relationship, power is not fixed, but shifts as each becomes independent in a positive way on the resources the other person may offer. This process builds a relationship and takes time to accomplish" (2001, 104-105). On this model, the teacher's authority is defined by the thought's, intentions, and purpose that the learner offers. He or she will shape the learning context by what the learner needs, and in turn, the learner's future needs will be shaped by the learning experiences the teacher offers. In this way, power and authority are reciprocal between the learner and the teacher, much like the reciprocity described in the relationship between Noddings' *cared-for* and *one-caring*⁴¹. Each individual in the relationship is honoring and valuing the other as person.

On a new model of moral education, teacher authority becomes "a relational concept, arising from the particular bonds of respect, concern, and trust that particular teachers and students establish among themselves. Nicholas Burbules takes up the relational use of power in defining that the authority of the teacher is not found in terms of position or justified by the end that it produces: "Authority in this sense exists neither before nor beyond the interactions, communicative or otherwise, that join two or more parties in a relation of mutuality and shared interest" (1995, 36). The important notion to take from Burbules is that the teacher has no authority prior to being in the presence of learners. In this way, the teacher's authority is established through her relationship with the learner. On this definition, the teacher's authority will look different with each learner because it is defined through each individual relationship. The teacher becomes the guide that each learner needs, and he or she does this through listening to each learner's thoughts, desires, and purpose. Thus, the authority of the teacher is negotiated and renegotiated as the learner grows and develops academically, socially, and morally.

⁴¹ See Chapter 3.

The teacher's authority is also found in the skills required for the caring and educating of others. For example, the teacher must be able to carefully plan experiences for the learner, engage in reflective practice, and understand the meaning of experiences (van Manen 1991). Max van Manen adds to a relational concept of authority and how the teacher ought to relate to the learner using the concept of *tact* (van Manen 1991). Tact, as described by van Manen is "the practice of being oriented to others" (1991, 139)⁴². This involves that teachers have skills that enable them to be flexible to the moment, discern the good from the bad, and know the pedagogical qualities that makes an educative experience. The teacher-learner relationship also needs to be reciprocal and be built upon trust, respect, experience and authenticity. It cannot be presumed to exist before the two individuals meet and it must be defined and negotiated between both the teacher and the learner as they engage in education together.

Along with tact, the teacher must also be aware of using this power *with* the learner. He or she must understand that the power does not belong to one member or the other, and that it does not flow "back and forth" between teacher and learner leaving one empowered and the other powerless. Rather, it is shared with both members having it at the same time. Maxine Greene (1986) explains this notion by describing how power is used to profit the teacher-learner relationship and how it does not belong as the sole element in defining the authority of the teacher. The authority of the teacher is only defined by the relationship –part of this is that the power is used by both members to connect with the humanness of oneself and others and engage with each other as persons:

We cannot negate the fact of power. But we can undertake a resistance, a reaching out towards becoming *persons* among *persons*...to engage with our students as persons is to affirm our own incompleteness, our consciousness of spaces still to be explored, desires still

⁴² The notion of pedagogical tact that van Manen is drawing upon was originally developed by Herbart. For more on Herbart's concept see English (2013).

to be tapped, possibilities still to be opened and pursued. At once, it is to rediscover the value of care, to reach back to experiences of caring and being cared for as sources of ethical ideal. It is, Noddings says, an ideal to be nurtured through ‘dialogue, practice, and confirmation,’ processes much akin to those involved in opening a public sphere. We have to find out how to open such spheres, such spaces, where a better state of things can be imagined; because it is only through the projection of a better social order that we can perceive the gaps in what exists and try to transform and repair. (Greene 1986, 440-441)

Indeed, the act of opening such spheres, “where a better state of things can be imagined” (Greene 1986, 440-441) is the teacher’s authority. The teacher must take a resistance to designated and distributive power, and he or she must aim to meet the learners as a “person among persons” (Greene 1986, 440-441). This meeting is what is described by Noddings as *caring* in education, and it is what I define as the teacher’s duty and authority. More specifically, the teacher shifts his or her perspective of power to a relational outlook where he or she perceives the power as a negotiation that is used to cultivate his or her own identity as an educator as well as the moral dimension of the learner. Indeed, for Greene, the teacher’s authority is to structure a learning environment where this type of inquiry can happen. The teacher structures the learning environment while the learner maneuvers his way within it. In this regard, the learner leads the way along his educational process within the structure of the teacher. After the learning environment is created, the teacher becomes a ‘guide on the side’, continuing to reveal social norms and boundaries, but, at the same time, respecting the free will, self-agency, and ‘power of possibility’ of the learner⁴³. Schools can be seen as critical-learning environments created by teachers *for* learners.

⁴³See Maxine Greene, *In Search of a Critical Pedagogy* (1986). Greene defines how passion has been called the power of possibility.

The teacher can also begin to embrace authority as relational by actively engaging in limiting their power. That is, the teacher can refuse to use all the currencies at his or her disposal (Wilmot & Hoher 2001, 121). For example, this means that the teacher can *choose* to differentiate the curriculum to meet the needs, wants, and desires of the learners, and the school administrator can *choose* not to suspend and use fear to exercise control and pressure conformity. When the teacher's authority shifts from a positional to a relational use of power in that he or she defines it in setting up the educational context and differentiating the curriculum so that the learner can be empowered, the teacher listens to the learner's thoughts, desires, and purposes, and orchestrates opportunities for his or her strengths to be realized. When the administrator's authority is defined by the relationship with a learner, he or she believes in differentiating the routines of the school to meet the learner's thought's desires, and purposes. Because of these *choices*, and altered view of authority, both the teacher and the administrator put the learner in a state of reflection where he or she imagines and *feels* the possibility that they are seen as a person, rather than an agent to be controlled and conformed.

For John Dewey (1938), it is not only the experiences for academic, social, and moral growth that are important in the education process, but also the direction the growth of the learner takes. To be sure, it is the authority of the teacher to monitor this direction to ensure it lends itself positively and with the potential of further experiences. The quality, then, is what influences the way in which the continuity goes. The educator now has a more difficult responsibility. He or she must not only possess the perspective of a relational educational context, but also creativity, insight, judgment, and tact. The educator must be able to "judge what attitudes are conducive to continued growth and what are detrimental. He must, in addition, have the sympathetic understanding of individuals as individuals." (Dewey 1938, 39).

Thus, the teacher's authority is found in the responsibility of orchestrating experiences where the learner can shine and also in judging the quality of the experiences to ensure future learning.

4.2 Authority and Freedom

If the teacher provides too much guidance and leadership, if he tells the pupil everything he needs to know, if he exercises an indisputable and weighty authority, the pupil is liable to find himself on a path with the sun in his eyes, blinding him and preventing him from picking out a route for himself. On the other hand, if the teacher gives no guidance or leadership, if he tells the child nothing, and makes him find his own way unaided, the child finds himself on the same path, this time in total darkness, without even minimal light necessary to see his way⁴⁴. -Paul Nash

Of course, there is a need for rules and expectations to ensure the safety of all persons in an educational context. Rules and expectations of conduct aim to ensure the dignity, respect, and rights of all persons. After all, I am not suggesting that the teacher allows for an educational environment where learners do whatever they want, for this could be unethical and destructive. At the same time, there needs to be a model of education that respects democracy without restricting the intellectual freedom of the learners. Nash (1966) explains:

What is limited is not necessarily hampered by those limitations; its limits can be a means of its achieving a certain freedom. The river is limited and confined by its banks but these same banks permit it to move onward freely to the sea. Without its banks the river would collapse into a swamp; only through limitation can it reach its goal. Man, similarly, needs limitations and discipline before he can find direction. Fullest expression of his degree of freedom is despondent on an ordering and limiting discipline. Lack of such discipline results in a wandering aimlessness, associated with ignorance, sickness of the mind or body, indolence, or self-indulgence. (113)

⁴⁴ See Nash (1966, 108).

It is the leadership by teachers that demonstrate to the learners how one can show respect for democracy by using power and discipline appropriately and in a way that cultivates humanity by treating others as persons and not as means to an end: “A more profitable line of education enquiry than continuing the dispute between freedom and discipline is to ask what degree and form of discipline will best prepare the child for specific kinds of freedom” (Nash 1966, 111). Restraint and limitation are necessary for achieving order and direction.

Dewey also takes up the problem of individual freedom and social control. How much freedom is allowed to the learner? How does the educator provide leadership and maneuver through social control? Dewey (1938) provides a response to these inquiries through a game metaphor. Games have rules that all parties respect because without the rules there is no game. The rules ensure that the rights of the participants are respected and that order is conducted: “The rules are part of the game. They are not outside of it” (Dewey 1938, 52). Dewey explains how the group as a whole is what established order, as opposed to one individual. Perhaps this is the difference in the traditional and progressive educational paradigms. Order in the traditional paradigm was imposed and maintained by the teacher (regardless of the thoughts, desires, and purposes of the learners). Order in the progressive paradigm is developed by the whole. It involves negotiation, interaction, leadership, and continuity. The control, states Dewey (1938), is exercised by situations: “the parent or educator exercises it as the representative and agent of the interests of the group as a whole” (54). The control is not the will of the teacher or an ‘exhibition’ of personal power. Rather, the teacher’s control (his leadership) now involves much more intellect:

He must survey the capacities and needs of the particular set of individuals with whom he is dealing and must at the same time arrange the conditions which provide the subject-matter or

content for experiences that that satisfy these needs and develop these capacities. The planning must be flexible enough to permit free play for individuality of experience and yet firm enough to give direction towards continuous development of power. (Dewey 1938, 58)

Sandra Way (2011) concludes that “more school rules and higher perceived strictness predicts more, not less, disruptive behavior” (346). In fact, “examinations at the school level have found that schools that implement more physical and personal security measures have more violence and disorder”⁴⁵. Certainly, the more exertions of power in the form of restricting intellectual freedom, and the more feelings of distrust and conformity, causes learners to react negatively and from a place of disrespect. They will not a place that does not value them as persons. This critical meeting, of persons among persons, as described by Greene, is not established through an exertion of positional power. In contract, it activates the ego within the learner (*amour-propre*) and their behaviour works from a place of anger. They automatically feel labelled, defeated, and a means to an end. When people are exposed to power over them for long periods of time, they function from a bitter place of distrust, skepticism, and vulnerability:

Just as power can corrupt, *powerlessness* can also corrupt. If lower-power people are continually subjected to harsh treatment or lack goal attainment, they are likely to produce some organized resistance to higher-power people. When one reaches the stage where 'nothing matters' [one cannot attain his or her goals through accepted means] violence, or despair is spawned. Too much losing does not build character; it builds frustration, aggression, and apathy. (Wilmot & Hocher 2001, 116)

Learners need to experience empowerment throughout their education. They need to know and feel that they are persons with thoughts, desires, and purposes. More importantly, they need to have their humanness realized in order to build character and cultivate their humanity. This is the very essence of moral education, and one that defines the very aspect that has been forgotten.

⁴⁵ See Mayer and Leone (1999) as cited in Way (2011, 351).

Furthermore, this knowing one's own humanness and being allowed to cultivate one's humanity is achieved through the authority of the teacher; that is, how the teacher establishes the educational context, both directly and indirectly. The way a teacher establishes the educational context branches from his or her core beliefs about authority and identity as a teacher. The moral education model asks for the teacher to deconstruct his or her beliefs and assumptions about authority, power, and freedom, and rebuild a foundation that understands authority as relational and being exerted in the establishment of the direct and indirect workings of the classroom that perceive it as a context of persons among persons.

4.3 Authority and Respect: Valuing Persons Among Persons

The first respect is to respect myself—to know that I am naturally valuable⁴⁶.

-Tillman & Hsu

Respect is a term when dealing with authority and it is an essential component in self-agency. Respect is traditionally used to imply submission and obedience, and for some people it still holds this meaning. Actually, respect seems to have many definitions depending on its context and the individuals involved. For example, within a traditional educational context, it would be socially expected for respect to present itself as the learner doing the tasks outlined by the teacher without protest or criticism. This also gets translated into the home. For the child, respectful behavior meant following and complying with adult demands. Authority that wasn't acknowledged or valued by the receiving party held no 'power'; authority that was valued and

⁴⁶ See Tillman & Hsu (2001).

acknowledged proceeded to be used as a ‘power’ over others. This is why I see that as the authority of the teacher has evolved and changed, and is no longer rooted in power, age, or wisdom, so has the definition of respect. That is, respect is no longer a means to establishing authority. The two notions are separate entities with different meanings and goals. Respect no longer defines authority, but it does contribute to defining a relationship. It creates meaning in a relationship with the world, characterized by a valuing of oneself and others.

For Immanuel Kant, respect for humans is first rooted in moral law and in duty which is derived from reason (1788). This supports the first dimension of respect; the cognitive argument:

If we examine accurately the notion of respect for persons as it has been already laid down, we shall perceive that it always rests on the consciousness of a duty which an example shows us, and that respect, therefore can never have any but a moral ground, and that it is very good and even, in a psychological point of view, very useful for the knowledge of mankind, that whenever we use this expression we should attend to this secret and marvelous, yet often recurring, regard which men in their judgment pay to the moral law.⁴⁷

Indeed, there is a difference between a duty for respect and a feeling of respect. The duty comes first because it is derived from reason and moral law. If we acted only on the feeling of respect, neglecting a common rationale, then the expression would be subjective and possibly rooted in negative intentions and selfishness. Respect would no longer be based on reason and in universal moral law. For this reason, the first dimension of respect is of a cognitive nature and then closely followed by an experiential and emotional component. In other words, the first measure in acquiring respect is to know what it means and the second measure is to experience it

⁴⁷ Kant (1788), *The Critique of Practical Reason*, translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (website: <http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-practical-reaso.txt>) (accessed May 8th, 2014).

by interacting with others. If one is to *act* or express oneself in a way that is respectful, one first has to understand it and *be* it.

For many learners, generating this *feeling* towards themselves and/or another is too difficult and hindered by emotions of anger, low esteem, and low self-worth. I contend that one cannot learn and generate this feeling of respect for another if one has not first learned and generated the feeling of respect towards themselves⁴⁸:

The importance of self-respect is that it provides a secure sense of our own value, a firm conviction that pure conception of the good is worth carrying out. Without self-respect nothing may seem worth doing, and even if some things have value for us, we may lack the will to pursue them. The good person, who respects himself, will inevitably respect the interests of others and feel obliged to support their self-respect, while the evil person seeks to degrade others by violating their self-respect. (Goodman 2009, 6)

To bridge the rational and experiential dimensions, I suggest that we need to go back to teaching and experiencing our duty as human beings. As I referred to in Chapter 1, Kant's (1785/1993) Categorical Imperative is still relevant; we need to "act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same times as an end and never simply as a means⁴⁹." That is, we need to act in a way where respect means treating something or someone with unconditional value; and as suggested by Goodman (2009), this includes the self. This idea of the interconnectedness of self-respect and respect for others is brought out in Rousseau's notion of *amour de soi-même*, and Herbart's notions of inner

⁴⁸ The model of education presented in this thesis argues that respect for others is projected from a respect for self. In this way, the child must be respected by another person (experientially), then learns to respect him or herself, then learns to respect others. The educational context is a unique environment for moral development because the experiences are mostly orchestrated by the teacher rather than naturally as seen in everyday life. For that reason, a person learns to respect himself in the context of a teacher who treats him with respect. Therefore, it is the teacher's responsibility to relate with a learner in such a way that fosters the learner's understanding of his or her own self-respect.

⁴⁹ Cited by Joan Goodamn: Kant, I (1785/1993, 36), *Grounding for the metaphysics of morals with on a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns*, 3rd ed. Trans. J.W. Ellington. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.

freedom and a warmth for the good (discussed in Chapter 1). It is a self-love built on preservation and the connectedness to one's own humanness that develops this personal valuing, self-respect, and the ability to value others.

For Joan Goodman (2009), respect begins with this basic valuing of human life and develops into a more mutual engagement involving components of dignity, autonomy, and equality. Human dignity refers to the rules we teach about valuing a human being physically, emotionally, and mentally (no hitting, teasing, mimicking, etc.). Autonomy is when respect has moved further into a personalized dimension. The individual now values the other based on human dignity and on knowing and experiencing their qualities (making own choices, responsibility). Equality refers to respect based on sharing, equal acknowledgement of the human condition, and knowing others are affected by one's actions. The argument for respect based on equality also lends itself subject to theories of justice.

Goodman (2009) proposes that the teacher-learner relationship needs to progress from *respect-due* towards *respect-earned*. *Respect-due* is basing respect on human dignity and not using another human being as a means to an end. Goodman's *respect-earned* is reached after the parties in a relationship have moved from respect based on human dignity to respect based on autonomy and equality. When this happens, the individuals in the relationship mutually value each other based on the others' qualities and actions: "*Respect-earned*, unlike *respect-due*, is contingent upon meeting a set of expectations and is voluntarily conferred (by teacher and by child). It results from the esteem one person has for another and is achieved by merit as a student and teacher mark and attain agreed-upon norms" (Goodman 2009, 13). When the *respect-due* is demanded it sets the students up to feel unvalued. Indeed, much like we saw in

Noddings reciprocity of caring, the feeling of *respect-due* is not created by control and demands, but rather through experience and a relationship based on perceiving each other as persons.

Chapter 5: Possibilities and Limitations of Current Initiatives and Criteria for Developing and Critiquing Moral Education Initiatives

We need to bring into interplay the pairs which Descartes divorced (subject/object, value/fact, mind/body, and derivatives such as intuition/reason, spirit/matter, feeling/thought, synthesis/analysis). Each pair should be seen not as unconnected opposites but as constant and dynamic interaction and, thus, complementary. The dominance of the cerebral over other human qualities such as the emotional, the intuitive, and the spiritual stunts human potential; it leads to our remaining 'the unfinished animal'. It follows that we cannot hope to achieve personal transformation at a purely intellectual level. If the heart is not engaged and if the patterns of behaviour remain unchanged there is no real transformation⁵⁰. -Pike & Selby

In this chapter, I draw attention to three styles of initiatives that have been implemented in schools with the aim of cultivating the moral capacities of learners. Within this analysis, I offer a critique of *how* the initiatives have been implemented, and how their implementation has been discussed, within local schools and classroom settings in my area⁵¹. The first initiative, PEBS, is derived from behaviourist theory and uses rewards as initiatives to correct and change behaviour. This initiative draws on tools and strategies based in the theory that by changing the outer expression of a behavior through classical conditioning, the learner will adopt changes in the way he acts in similar future situations. The second initiative, the Restorative Approach, is based in relational theory and engages the learner in processing the social and emotional implications of his actions on others. The third initiative, Living Values Education Program, is based in a theory of experience and requires the learner to know through being; that is, thinking and feeling positively about his own human capacities. I draw attention to both the positive and shortfalls of each initiative in cultivating the moral dimension of the learner. I also propose three

⁵⁰ See Pike & Selby (1998, 27-28).

⁵¹ I recognize that there is a distinction between a theory and its practical implementation, but for the purposes of this thesis, I will not be analyzing all the nuance of the theories themselves, rather I focus on the implementation. My view arises from personal experience in the Halifax School District as well as my attendance at Workshops PBIS, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2010 where strategies for implementing these theories have been discussed by educators.

criteria that any initiative which aims to cultivate morality within the learner should meet. The chapter closes with a conclusion and final thoughts about future research and direction in moral education.

5.1 Current Initiatives in Schools: PEBS, the Restorative Approach, Living Values Education Program

The American initiative, Positive Behavior Interventions and Supports (PBIS) (Crone et al. 2003), that has been adapted in Nova Scotia as Positive Effective Behavior Supports (PEBS), offers a school-wide response to the increase of negative behaviors and violence in schools. The PBIS model is data driven and based in behaviourist psychology. It uses empirical evidence and behavior assessments to assess the function of a learner's behavior and implement reward systems and initiatives to improve that behavior. Learners are labeled as having red, yellow, or green zone behaviors, which in turn are used to aid teachers in adjusting the way they interact with the learner (Crone et al. 2003). Green zone students are those learners that positively respond to all classroom management strategies and systems, yellow zone students are those learners that respond positively some of the time, and red zone students are those learners that require individualized management strategies and classroom routines. The second component to implementing the PEBS model is the use of GOTCHA's or rewards to promote future positive behaviours. GOTCHA's take the form of a piece of paper that is given to students when they are 'caught' showing respect for themselves, others, learning, and the environment. This model is effective in getting teachers to recognize that all learners have various and diverse needs, and it gets teachers looking for the learners' positive expressions of behaviour. However, if we look at this model with a moral education lens, we can see that it falls short. For instance, PEBS does

not pay attention to the inner experience of both the teacher and the learner. The learner learns how to demonstrate respect through an outer show, but little is done to provide experiences where he or she can develop his or her thoughts, desires, and purpose, and connect to his or her own humanness. Alfie Kohn remarks, “The unsettling news about rewards and punishments are worthless at best, and destructive at worst, for helping children develop such values and skills. What rewards and punishments do produce is *temporary compliance*. They buy us obedience... But if we are ultimately concerned with the kind of people our children will become, there are no shortcuts. Good values have to be grown from the inside out.” (1993,161). For these reasons, the learner misses the moral aspect of education and the opportunity to develop an inner censor and warmth for the good. The focus is on what will happen to the learner if he doesn’t do something favorable, when it should be on why the act is unfavorable in the first place⁵².

The Restorative Practices model and approach⁵³ in schools aims to ensure the opportunity for each learner to see his responsibility in a social interaction, and it focuses on restoring this relation to an amicable equilibrium. This model focuses on the emotive aspect of relationships as well as an understanding of others’ perspectives. It promotes inquiry that gets the learner to think about his own assumptions and mentalize the impacts of his decisions. In addition, it gets the learner to consider what mattered about what happened. It embraces reflection and in that way it nurtures the self-self relation. However, at the same time, its deficits are found in learning about oneself outside of others. It heavily focuses on the individual as a member of society (which as Rousseau notes, activates the ego⁵⁴) and not the individual as an individual. The Restorative Approach gets the learner to consider his actions, behaviors, and intentions based on

⁵² See Alfie Kohn, *Punished by Rewards*, pp.169-176 (1993).

⁵³ See Ted Wachtel: <http://www.iirp.edu/pdf/Defining-Restorative.pdf> (accessed May 28, 2014).

⁵⁴ See Chapter One on Rousseau’s notion of *amour-propre*.

the perceptions of and impact on others rather than ends in themselves. For this reason, I find that although the restorative approach is conducive to providing the experiences that promote moral reflection, it lacks the prior element of focusing on the individual and connecting him to his own humanness first.

The Living Values Education Program (LVEP)⁵⁵, is a philosophical initiative that aims to set up experiences where participants will discover their inner potential and value by discovering who they are and connecting to their own humanness. Values such as peace, respect, love, humility, happiness, honesty, cooperation, unity, simplicity, and tolerance have been declared as universal and collectively agreed upon human wants across religions, genders, and cultures (Delors, 1996). LVEP is exceptional in that it engages the learner both cognitively and emotionally –rationalizing about the meanings of the values and experiencing/being the values. The initiative aims to connect the learner with his human self. From this, the learner is able to engage in more academic activities because he or she has an awareness of his or her self. And, as mentioned by Dewey, educative experiences begin with what the learner already knows⁵⁶. They must connect him to his past, meet him in his present, and offer reflection so that he can imagine possibilities for the future. They must also appeal to his intellect and curiosity. El Hassen & Kahil (2005) find that a systemic educational curriculum that uses moral values as its foundation –“the ones [values] that carry an obligation to what we ought to do through treating all people everywhere justly, respecting their lives and worth of human beings⁵⁷” –promotes academic, social, and moral achievement.

⁵⁵ See Diane Tillman (2002) *Theoretical Background and Support for Living Values; An Educational Program*.

⁵⁶ See Dewey, *Experience and Education* (1938): “He must be aware of the potentialities for leading students into new fields which belong to experiences already had, and must use this knowledge as his criterion for selection and arrangement of the conditions that influence their present experience.” (76). Also see Chapter 7 in its entirety.

⁵⁷ See Lickona et al. (1992) as cited in Hassen & Kahil (2005, 81-82).

Within this approach, the learner's behaviour becomes a function of his inner censor and moral compass. LVEP recognizes this as change within the learner's "interpersonal and intrapersonal behaviours and attitudes" (Drake, 2002)⁵⁸. Learners begin to act in such a way that they aim to be their best; not in a way that aims to *be* the best and function from ego, but to develop their own needs, wants, desires, and capacities so that they are working at their maximum potential. As noted in Cottom (1996, 2), the school's "achievements are linked directly to its emphasis on values that include excellence as a life-long attitude. Classroom experiences center on learning universal values such as kindness, honesty, cooperation, and responsibility... For students, aiming for their best is not an external push, but an internal desire"⁵⁹. This is supported within Rousseau's educational theory of *amour de soi-même* and *amour-propre*. It also is reflected in Herbart's discourse of developing character and an inner censor within the learner that understands a warmth for the good. Finally, the LVEP initiative aligns with Dewey's notion of educative experiences because the program has lessons designed to provide an experience for the learner to *be* the values rather than ponder or consider what they might feel like.

Although the LVEP is the foundation of what a moral education ought to provide, it is not without shortcomings. Perhaps one of these that is most pressing are skills. For instance, the Restorative Approach provides learners with the communication skills to articulate and engage in dialogue about their interpersonal state and reflect about the consequences and impacts of their actions on themselves and others. This skill of dialogue, and learning how to communicate with others, is imperative to being with others (the skills of relating are not an emphasis in LVEP as this initiative is focused on the self). As noted by Freire & Shor (1987), dialogue is a "means to

⁵⁸ As cited in Hassen & Kahil (2005, 82).

⁵⁹ As cited in Hassen & Kahil (2005, 82).

transform social relations in the classroom and to raise awareness about relations in society at large” (11). A dialogical situation allows for the teacher and the learner to interact morally with each other. They can engage in an exchange about what matters about what has happened and consider future courses of action. The teacher guides the learner through educative experiences while offering consultation about what is happening, explaining why things appear the way they do, and offer hope for new directions: “Dialogue is a moment where humans meet to reflect on their reality as they make and remake it” (Freire & Shor 1987, 13). And, as noted by Herbart and Dewey, this interruption in one’s way of knowing the world and the experience in itself are where the reconstruction of knowledge and the connection to one’s inner censor happen.

5.2 Criteria for Evaluating New Initiatives in Moral Education

I have developed three criteria that any school-based initiative should meet to be considered appropriate for developing the moral dimension of the learner. These initiatives are derived from the educational theories of Rousseau, Herbart, and Dewey.

Firstly, the initiative should focus on connecting the learner to his own humanness. This involves providing experiences for the learner to learn about his own abilities and capacities, as well as those common to all human beings. Initiatives that complement this criteria get the learner to consider what the underlying *value*⁶⁰ is of his actions and those of others. For example, the teacher may lead the learner to understand that he lied because he was *insecure*. In this case, the initiative would help the learner understand his feeling of insecurity and get him to consider what he can do to become secure. The focus remains on the individual and connecting him to his own capacities. In another case, the learner may discover that she got on a horse

⁶⁰ Values are defined as those human personal and social wants that function behind our behaviour. For instance, one might discover they acted in such a way because they wanted respect, happiness, love, etc. Another example is that one might learn that he is brave, smart, friendly, assertive, kind, outgoing, peaceful, etc.

because she is *brave*. An initiative that meets this criteria would help the learner focus on the feeling of being brave so that she ultimately understands this value and can identify it as a human capacity common to others⁶¹.

The second criteria is that the initiative should focus on the inter and intrapersonal development by embracing the *inner freedom* of the learner. Within this notion, as described by Herbart in Chapter Two, the learner is afforded the opportunity to engage in an interruption; a ‘stop and think’ moment where he can choose that of serving his ego or serving what is best for himself and others⁶². Practical skills required in this criteria are listening and dialogue. Indeed, the teacher needs to *listen* to each learner’s inner censor and consider those future experiences that will further cultivate his morality. He or she must also listen to the learner’s past and understand from where his or her decisions are functioning. Also within this criteria is the notion of experience and that the initiative should appeal to both the cognitive and experiential capacities of the learner. By engaging the learner in an interruption, the teacher is appealing to his cognition.

The third criteria is that the initiative should be conducive to a democratic learning context. As mentioned earlier, this is a learning environment where freedom is embraced and certain experiences are carefully planned and facilitated. The teacher views teaching and learning as “a continuous process of reconstruction of experience” (Dewey 1938, 87). The initiative must be such that it can offer educative experiences to the learner within a democratic context. Furthermore, it must also be one that can stand within a classroom ethos where the

⁶¹ Within my own practice, I use dialogue that takes the attention away from me recognizing them (which activates the ego) and puts the focus on independence and self-agency. In the case of the girl getting on the horse, I would say, “Wow! Look at you shining with the brave star!” as opposed to “I am so proud of you for getting on the horse”. The latter statement puts the emphasis on me (I) and the former emphasizes the learner’s own capacity and connects her to her accomplishment (there is *you* and no *I*).

⁶² See English, *Discontinuity and Learning* (2013): “Our inner struggle becomes part of moral decision making when it marks the point at which we have the choice to move away from egotistic actions and move toward actions that respect others. These are the moments in which we ask ourselves, ‘What should I do?’ (8).

learner feels cared for, understood, respected, valued, and safe (Tillman & Hsu, 2001).

Initiatives that place emphasis on *how* something is learned and *why* something matters support a democratic learning context.

Conclusion: Reflections on Future Directions of Moral Education

This thesis concludes with reflections on a future model of moral education. This model would be inclusive of Rousseau's *amour de soi-même*, Herbart's philosophies of interruption and the inner censor, and Dewey's pragmatic theories of the classroom environment. This model cannot be constructed on a foundation of reward and punishment and grounded in an environment of fear and insecurity. The learning models that represent the learner as the empty vessel and the teacher as all-knowing do not support moral education. I propose that the public education model restructure to provide teachers the freedom to shift their perspectives on educating from teaching and delivering curriculum guides to facilitating the connection of the human learner with his *self*. When learners are perceived through a moral lens, the components that comprise the teacher-learner relationship are carefully and delicately considered and constructed. Teachers not only care about what they say, but *how* they say it. They develop an increasing awareness of the setting, the environment, the emotions, the context, and the ambiance of the situations and experiences offered in their classrooms. They ask themselves, "Does the learner feeling safe, understood, respected, and valued?", "Am I orchestrating experiences that begin with the learner's experiences", "Am I guiding the learner through his or her interruptions to get him or her to see what matters about what has happened?", and "Is the way I am relating with the learner ensuring respect, trust, safety, and security?". This type of critical pedagogical inquiry also leads teachers to question current educational practices and models and reflect upon their intentions and impacts on cultivating morality within the human learner.

Education for the twenty-first century is one of identity. The learner is constantly reconstructing who he or she is based on his or her experiences and projections. He or she

gathers information about his or her *self* from the people with whom he or she is in relation. Because of this, the teacher is a powerful figure in the learner's life that has influence on his or her self-self relation and consequently, his or her moral development. Our educational model is shifting from one of master pedagogy –“the pedagogical aim of bringing our students to ‘love what we have loved’”⁶³ to a relational pedagogy where the aim is for the learner to love what he or she loves. In *Radical Pedagogy* (2006), Mark Bracher remarks that “For in order to embody the authority's identity components [master pedagogy], student's must enact them –through their reading, their writing, or their thinking and/or in their political and interpersonal actions. And this means that they often have to suppress or allow to atrophy those parts of their selves that are different from those of the authority's identity” (88). In this case, the student constructs his identity based on what the teacher projects and wants. This is where education is failing the moral dimension of the learner. This thesis proposes another model where the learner constructs his own identity, different from the authority, and based in *his* self-love and human capacities.

At the same time this is happening for the learner, the teacher is remaking his or her identity as well. He or she is learning a new authority and a new way of being in the classroom. The teacher must reconstruct his or her identity from his or her own self-self relation, much like that of the learner. His or her teacher identity must embrace their human capacities and he or she must engage in interruption and educative experiences. The teacher must ask him or herself, “Who am I as a teacher and educator?” and “Who do I want to be as a teacher and educator?”⁶⁴.

⁶³ See Mark Bracher, *Radical Pedagogy* (2006, 86).

⁶⁴ William Hare (1993) proposes that a good teacher is someone who possess the qualities of “humility, courage, impartiality, open-mindedness, empathy, enthusiasm, judgment, and imagination” (v). Moreover, “such a person, needless to say, is not an *expert* in perfecting the human and social qualities, but someone who is sensitive to the problem to which Socrates calls attention [Who should teach children?] and who possesses and displays certain human and social virtues” (Hare 1993, v). Hare is bringing to our attention the need for teachers to consider their own qualities and identities and how these project upon and influence the learners in their care.

When asked, “*Why do you want to become a teacher?*” the most popular responses are “Because I love kids” or “I want my summers off”. For me, neither of these reasons fueled the drive that put me on the path to education. In fact, I didn’t know why I wanted to be a teacher until I become one. That’s when I learned that teaching is human work. Put another way, teaching is not caring about *what* children will become, but rather it is an intensive focus of *who* they will become. I have learned through 10 years of teaching that the days I left my classroom and felt the most successful were not the days that I taught a great math lesson. Rather, they were the days that a student left a note behind saying I was the best teacher in the world. And, most of the time, this was from the student that challenged my teaching and strategies the most. For, I was the best teacher in the world because I provided the means for something to change inside them. I was the best teacher in the world because I made them matter. For me, one of the best things about teaching is this human work, because while I’m providing this for others, they are also providing this for me. I have learned a lot about myself through the teaching profession. I have learned to be patient, organized, social, brave, humble, forgiving, loving, and creative. It is one of the places in my life that lets me be at my best and connects me to my human self. Having the privilege of cultivating this within another human being is the ultimate gift of the teaching profession.

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